TOWARD PROCEDURAL OPTIONALITY:
PRIVATE ORDERING OF
PUBLIC ADJUDICATION
ROBERT J. RHEE*
Private resolution and public adjudication of disputes are commonly seen as discrete, antipodal processes. The essence of private dispute resolution is that the parties can arrange the disputed rights and entitlements per agreement and without
judicial intervention. In public adjudication, however, the sovereign mandates the
substantive and procedural laws to be applied, many of which cannot be changed
by either a party’s unilateral decision or both parties’ mutual consent. Neither
approach allows a party an option to unilaterally alter important aspects of the
process, such as the attorney fee rules and standards of proof. This understanding
is commonly accepted and rarely challenged, but it is curious nonetheless.
This Article proposes that we move toward procedural optionality, the idea that
each party should have options to choose certain procedural laws in public adjudication. To show the potential efficacy of this concept, this Article proposes a
scheme in which parties can unilaterally shift fees as long as they contractually
bond their good faith by assuming a higher standard of proof. Allowing private
choice to alter these rules can better address the problems of frivolous suits and
nonprosecution of low value claims—two problematic bookends in the spectrum of
litigation. By properly structuring party options, the law can create greater convergence of private incentives and social interest. More efficient dispute resolution
results, as measured by increased enforcement of and compliance with the substantive laws, at lower cost. Lastly, this Article concludes by examining more broadly
some policy implications of procedural optionality for substantive and procedural
laws.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of law is one of obligation.1 This concept has particular force in the realm of procedural and procedure-related laws, such
as attorney fee allocation rules and standards of proof. While many
ministerial applications of procedural laws are left to the discretion of
the parties in public adjudication, the laws are generally not subject to
private ordering, either unilaterally or pursuant to agreement. In this
sense, certain rules are inalienable and unalterable in public adjudication.2 This quality of the adjudicatory framework is axiomatic in our
legal culture.
But why should important procedural rules not be subject to a
degree of private ordering? At first blush, the suggestion that parties
can choose the rules of law seems fanciful. It is commonly thought
that the law’s ordering of entitlements and obligations is not optional.3
But this proposition overstates the matter. A substantive entitlement
in the form of a liability rule, such as tort law, can be seen as an option
1 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82 (2d ed. 1994) (“[W]here there is law,
there human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory.”).
2 A procedural rule is inalienable in the sense that the obligation is not subject to
rearrangement by the parties. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (1972) (“An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”).
3 See supra note 1.
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for subsequent reordering through legal pursuit of compensation for
the breach of the right; in other words, the defendant has the option to
breach the law and pay damages, and the aggrieved plaintiff has the
option to prosecute her claim.4
More fundamentally for the purposes of this Article, most disputes over legal rights settle without intervention of the public legal
process.5 While it is said that settlements take place “in the shadow of
the law,”6 most resolutions are achieved through private ordering
rather than public adjudication. Under private ordering, laws can be
modified or ignored altogether, should both parties so agree.7 But
when a dispute enters the realm of public adjudication, our understanding of “law” mostly returns to the model of fixed rules. In judicial proceedings, many procedural laws are inalienable; only courts
have the power to rearrange them, and only if the law allows such
discretion.
Although this is the generally accepted understanding, it is odd
that no one has asked the basic question: Why should certain procedural rules be inflexible, inalienable obligations when so much of dispute resolution is subject to private ordering through such
mechanisms as settlements and agreements to arbitrate or mediate?
To reject the axiom of fixed procedural laws, we must make only a
small, but crucial, conceptual leap. Typically, private ordering and
public adjudication are seen as discrete, antipodal processes. There is
little intermingling. But if we can envision a hybrid process, one
4 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092; see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW:
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 3–6 (2005) (arguing that substantive entitlements can be analyzed through prism of option theory). Option theory originally arose
from the field of financial economics, which developed theories for valuing financial
options such as call and put options. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 538–620 (8th ed. 2006) (introducing option theory).
5 Most disputes never reach the courthouse because most parties privately agree on
the price of the dispute and reach a settlement. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1 (1991) (“A principal finding is that
. . . neighbors apply informal norms, rather than formal legal rules, to resolve most of the
issues that arise among them.”); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE
SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 141 (1970) (noting that ninety-five
percent of bodily injury claims against insured automobile drivers are settled by negotiation). Even when lawsuits are filed, most cases still settle prior to the final disposition of
the matter by the court. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?
Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 730 tbl.7 (2004) (finding that settlement rate of contested federal civil cases is approximately sixty-nine percent as of year
2000).
6 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
7 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 65–81 (observing that neighbors often ignore
fence laws and apply informal norms that contradict legal prescriptions).
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capable of some degree of private ordering of law within public adjudication, then perhaps a party should be allowed to unilaterally
change certain important procedural laws or elements of the process.
Mutual agreements to alter procedural laws will generally lead parties
into alternative dispute resolution, and mutual agreements not to alter
procedural laws will typically lead parties into court. But what is not
currently available in either the public or private dispute resolution
forum is an option granted to each party to choose the application of
important procedural laws.
The idea of optional laws seems counterintuitive, but it is
informed by Ronald Coase’s work in The Problem of Social Cost.8
Coase argued that absent transaction costs, parties can efficiently
rearrange rights irrespective of their initial assignment.9 Like the substantive entitlements of property and tort law studied in Coase’s work,
procedural laws set forth an initial assignment of rights and obligations that have significant consequences for the value of lawsuits and
their cost to the litigation system. The thesis advanced in this Article
is a simple one: The inalienability of certain procedural rules in public
adjudication imposes significant cost and risk on parties, while private
rearrangement of procedural rights and duties can yield more efficient
dispute resolution.
This Article illustrates the efficacy of procedural optionality by
analyzing how private ordering of attorney fee rules and standards of
proof can mitigate persistent inefficiencies in the litigation system.
The problem of inefficient litigation is said to be great and has been
the subject of voluminous study and commentary. Two well-known
subsets of the larger problem—unpursued, low value, meritorious disputes and frivolous suits—are studied here. Both problems stem from
the American rule of attorney fees, according to which each side bears
its own fees. In the first subset, high probability, low value disputes
are not prosecuted because litigation cost can impose an insurmountable cost barrier to aggrieved persons. This problem has an inverse in
the second subset. Here, plaintiffs pursue low probability, frivolous
cases to extract an extortionate settlement because defendants sometimes settle to avoid paying a higher cost of defense.
The problems presented by these cases impart significant social
cost. They share the same fundamental dynamic: In each case, the
probability of success on the merits does not sufficiently influence the
ultimate disposition because the attorney fee rule is a fixed legal con8

R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
See id. at 15 (arguing that assuming no transaction costs, legal rights will be rearranged through market whenever it would increase value).
9
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stant. If the defendant in a frivolous action were able to opt unilaterally for a scheme in which the loser indemnifies the winner’s cost, he
could avoid settling with the frivolous plaintiff. Likewise, if an
aggrieved plaintiff in a low value action could opt unilaterally for fee
shifting, she could economically pursue her claim in court. But under
the current system of inalienable fee rules, these socially beneficial
outcomes are precluded.
The cost structure of the civil litigation system incentivizes frivolous suits and deters low value actions, in direct opposition to the societal interest.10 When dealing with such procedural defects, the habit
of thought has been to propose solutions requiring the imposition of
additional inflexible rules. This Article provides a different approach:
Rather than intervention in the typical form of rulemaking and judicial application, the sovereign should permit a quantum of private
choice in the selection of the procedural scheme in public adjudication. When parties are allowed to reorder certain procedural rules
after their initial assignment, dispute resolution can be better
achieved, both at the settlement table and in the courtroom.
The specific proposal advanced by this Article is a scheme in
which each party can elect to shift its fees to the loser upon prevailing,
so long as the party’s good faith belief in the merit of the case is
bonded by the assumption of a higher standard of proof.11 This
scheme would have the greatest effects on the margins of public litigation—claims that are either clearly meritorious or clearly frivolous.
This scheme better aligns the results of dispute resolution with important societal interests.
This Article concludes with the broader proposition that we
should move toward a greater hybridization of public and private dispute resolution processes. The specific proposal advanced here
focuses on frivolous and low value actions, but these problems are not
the only inefficiencies in our complex modern litigation system. This
Article suggests that future efforts to deal with these inefficiencies
consider procedural law not always as inalienable rules but as a set of
individual options that, by eliciting the parties’ privately held informa10 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577 (1997) (arguing that level of
litigation is not socially correct because there is divergence between private incentives and
social interest).
11 As used in this Article, “to bond” means to secure an obligation by making some
form of additional, up-front payment. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 193 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining verb “bond” as “[t]o secure payment by providing a bond”). For example, economists explain the act of purchasing stock as stockholders bonding their contractual obligation to bear the specialized risk of the enterprise by putting up the capital needed to
purchase assets. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM 141 (2000).
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tion and bonding their good faith belief in that information, can allow
for more efficient litigation and settlement.
I
SOURCES

OF

SOCIAL COST

IN THE

LITIGATION SYSTEM

A. The Inflexibility of Inalienable Procedural Rules
As used in this Article, the term “procedural rules” refers to rules
related to the adjudication of substantive rights, including attorney fee
rules and standards of proof.12 No one questions that disputants have
significant influence on the administration of public adjudication.
They have wide latitude in such matters as scheduling, plan of discovery, and trial presentation, and they routinely petition for
favorable application of certain procedural rules. Although these
functions are important, they are nevertheless ministerial or supplementary to the court’s power. While smart litigants gain a tactical
advantage by navigating these procedural nuances, the most fundamental procedural rules, such as attorney fee rules and standards of
proof, are inalienable. True, parties in public adjudication can privately contract for the loser to pay the winner’s legal fees, as is commonly done in arbitration. But these arrangements require a prior
relationship and contract, and they do not change the legal rule applicable in court.13 Thus, parties cannot contract to alter the attorney fee
rules or standards of proof that will be applied by the court in their
case.14 While the concept of inalienable rules in public adjudication
12 It is acknowledged that courts have defined the standards of proof and attorney fee
rules as matters of substantive law. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 35 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to attorney’s fees is ‘substantive’ under any reasonable definition of that term.”); Haberman v. Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264
(10th Cir. 2006) (noting that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, substantive law of forum
state governs standard of proof). This Article classifies these rules as procedural because
they relate to public adjudication but are essentially unrelated to the underlying entitlement giving rise to the dispute. This term is adopted for simplicity and clarity, and this
Article’s argument neither depends on nor intends to provoke a general rethinking of the
substance-procedure dichotomy. See generally Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing SubstanceProcedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (providing overview of protean nature of substantive and procedural divide
in context of corporate law).
13 Additionally, even in arbitration, courts sometimes prohibit the contractual rearrangement of certain entitlements. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 459, 462–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that arbitrator manifestly disregarded law by
refusing to award prevailing plaintiff attorney fee under Title VII); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (holding that arbitration agreement cannot limit statutory remedies such as right to punitive damages and attorney fees).
14 For example, we do not see a line of employment cases in which the employees have
agreed to a higher standard of proof in public adjudication as a condition of the employment contract.
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seems to be universally accepted, lack of controversy should not imply
correctness. We cannot underestimate the influence of procedural
rules on the interests of the parties and society. Since most informed
readers are familiar with these rules, only a brief background discussion is needed.
1. Attorney Fee Rules
Different policy considerations support the American and the
English rules of attorney fees, and the assignment of a fee rule applies
broadly to many classes of cases.15 Under the English rule, the losing
party indemnifies the prevailing party.16 Under the American rule,
each party is responsible for its own legal fees.17
The most persuasive reason for the English rule is that the prevailing party should be made “financially whole.”18 This argument is
compelling in the case of a frivolous suit19 or in a high probability, low
value case (hereinafter simply low value case), where the litigationcost barrier may otherwise bar a highly meritorious claim or defense.
But while a loser-pays rule discourages frivolous suits, the effect may
be too broad, deterring many risk-averse parties with meritorious
claims.20 The English rule discourages low probability, nonfrivolous
15 See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (exploring rationales and implications of fee-shifting
rules). In addition to these major rules, there is one-way fee shifting, which allows an
identified class of disputants, typically plaintiffs, attorney fees upon prevailing. See id. at
662–65 (explaining policies of one-way fee rule); see also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4246 (2006)
(“When the United States, through private counsel retained under this subchapter, prevails
in any civil action, the court, in its discretion, may allow the United States reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation as part of the costs.”); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2006) (“The court in such action shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of the action.”); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Cal. 1977)
(upholding award of attorney fees to plaintiffs under equitable doctrine of private attorney
general).
16 Rowe, supra note 15, at 651. But see Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees—An English Solution?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 345, 346 (1998) (noting that smallclaims disputes are primary exception in English legal system to general rule of fee
shifting).
17 Rowe, supra note 15, at 651.
18 Id. at 657–58.
19 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way”:
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodations, Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 888
(“Loser-pays fee shifting does have desirable effects—for example, fuller compensation of
winners and deterrence of nuisance claims.”).
20 See id. (“[T]he rule may excessively discourage the pressing of plausible but not
clearly winning claims, particularly when the prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk
averse.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America,
Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 330
(1998) (positing that English rule may deter risk-averse claimants from filing meritorious
actions).
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cases, many of which advance the public interest. The heavy reliance
placed on the deterrence argument to justify the fee-shifting rule for
all classes of cases seems inapposite, given that many cases are neither
frivolous nor highly probable. In a close case, a proportional cost allocation may be fairer, and the American rule better approximates this
concept.
The policy arguments for and against the American rule are
mirror opposites of those advanced in support of the English rule.21
The expenditure of attorney fees is not typically considered a legal
injury, and fee shifting is only allowed in special classes of cases when
justified by separate policy reasons. The American rule encourages
more low probability cases, including both frivolous and meritorious
actions.22 This promotion of legal actions may be more consistent
with American political sentiment, in that our justice system depends
on the individual assertion of rights to develop and advance the law.
The rule is more egalitarian and better balances the financial disparities that may exist between disputants. Under the English rule, the
wealthy person or institution may be privileged to sustain a frivolous
or low probability claim, resulting in strategic advantage, while the
average person may not.23
2. Standards of Proof
Next, consider the principal standards of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence (hereinafter the heightened
standard), and preponderance of the evidence (hereinafter the default
standard). The standard of proof is a risk-allocation device. In
assigning it, the law weighs the risk of error against the interest at
stake.24 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is used in
21 The American rule, to the extent that it connotes a general American practice, is
somewhat misleading. Exceptions to the rule are commonplace. Rowe, supra note 15, at
651 & n.5. There are six primary categories of exceptions: contracts containing fee-shifting
provisions, as well as common fund, substantial benefit, contempt, bad faith, and feeshifting statutes and rules of procedure. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney
Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578–90
(1993).
22 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59–60 (1982) (noting
that frequency of suits is greater under American rule when likelihood of success is below
“critical level”).
23 See Rowe, supra note 19, at 888 (noting that burden of English rule falls heavily on
middle class plaintiffs, who, unlike poor litigants, have money to lose and, unlike rich litigants, cannot afford to lose much).
24 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (“The more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision.”). Thus, under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the government
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criminal law because these cases involve the greatest interests, such as
the defendant’s life or liberty. The default standard is used in civil
litigation because both parties’ interests are deemed equally important. Indeed, Coase reformulated this general understanding when he
observed that the harm from an activity is typically reciprocal,
meaning that often harm to one cannot be prevented or remedied
without harm to another.25 This suggests that often the interests of
each party in civil cases, unlike criminal cases, cannot be normatively
distinguished. The heightened standard is a hybrid of the criminal and
civil standards and is usually reserved for an intermediate interest.
An example is punitive damages, which are sometimes characterized
as “quasi-criminal.”26 As a risk-allocation device, the standard of
proof, like substantive entitlements, clearly affects the value of a case.
The higher the standard of proof, the more difficult it is for a plaintiff
to prevail, ceteris paribus, and hence the value of her claim decreases.
In the vast majority of cases, the policy debate on the appropriate
risk allocation via the standards of proof has long been settled. It is
inconceivable that the criminal standard should be anything but the
highest, and it is conventionally accepted that the civil standard should
allocate the risks equally between plaintiff and defendant. The
debate, if there is one, involves determining the interests falling within
the heightened standard.27 This bit of untidiness aside, in most cases
the application of a particular standard of proof is not a point of contention but a legal constant to be acknowledged.
At some point in a case, the parties must ask the basic question:
What are the value, cost, and risk of this case? The primary variables
are the set of facts and substantive laws, and perhaps exogenous circumstances such as the draw of the judge, selection of the jurisdiction,
attorney quality, and so forth. Some aspects of procedural laws are
bears the substantial burden of erroneous decisions because the criminal defendant’s
interest at stake is so great.
25 Coase, supra note 8, at 2.
26 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); James v. Horace Mann Ins.
Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 670 (S.C. 2006). Many jurisdictions require punitive damages to be
established under the heightened standard. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens &
Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform
by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1013–14 (1999); see, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (West 2004) (establishing standard of awarding punitive damages
under “clear and convincing evidence” standard in product liability context).
27 See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 154 (Cal. 2001)
(applying heightened standard to decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment from
impaired but conscious person); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex. 1980) (applying
heightened standard to involuntary parent-child termination proceedings); State v.
Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 569 (Tex. 1979) (applying heightened standard to mental
health commitment proceedings).
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subject to variable application; for example, the parties have significant input on the process of discovery, and courts have significant discretion in administering the rules of procedure. With that said,
procedural rules are for the most part considered legal constants and
not variables. Due to legitimate reasons of fairness and predictability,
laws such as those governing attorney fee rules and standards of proof
make broad distinctions along classes of cases but not finer distinctions based on individual circumstance. In particular, the inalienability of attorney fee rules is regrettable because, ideally, it should be
a function of case merit.28
Since the application of these rules is incontestable, much of the
assignment of value, cost, and risk is centrally allocated through the
sovereign’s exclusive rulemaking power. The chief drawback of this
approach is its insensitivity to the unique circumstances of each dispute. This not only affects the interests of the parties but also touches
upon the important social interests of compliance and enforcement.
B. The Social Cost of the Litigation Structure
Assume that a political society deliberates and determines that an
activity is undesirable and thus sets a correct “price” for that activity
through the provision of rights and remedies.29 Assume further that
the concern is not whether the law is normatively correct but only
whether the optimal level of compliance and enforcement is achieved.
These laws set forth the rules of behavior, society expects compliance,
and liability compensates the holder of the right and deters the
wrongdoer.
The creation of private rights within the framework of a court
system serves two competing interests. First is the goal of perfect
compliance, in which the cost of harmful activity is fully internalized
by the injurer.30 An alternative utopian ideal is perfect enforcement,
which also fully internalizes the cost of one’s activity.31 Any deviation
28

See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 37 (1991) (arguing that society can create system of penalties by
taxing corporate activity deemed undesirable).
30 Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a
greater internalization of externalities.”).
31 Full internalization does not refer to equivalence in the sense of a market transaction. The suggestion here is that the cost is fully internalized within the limitations of a
legal system that compensates injuries, such as lost lives and limbs, with money. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005)
(discussing problem of assigning dollar value for life). Such issues have generated enormous controversy. See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
29
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from perfect compliance or enforcement creates a social problem. Let
us call this problem one of social inefficiency, meaning that some
injurers escape paying for the cost of their activities, contrary to
society’s prescription.32 Because it is clear that perfect compliance is
unachievable in the real world, enforcement is the only other means
by which to maximize social efficiency.
But enforcement presents significant transaction costs and thus
competes with the goal of cost minimization. The prosecution of a
private cause of action is costly in the American litigation system,
attorney fees being one of the most significant costs.33 Absent considerations other than compensation (such as the pursuit of justice irrespective of the cost-benefit analysis), it is wasteful to prosecute or
defend an action where the cost of doing so exceeds the harm suffered. The interdependencies of social and transaction cost efficiencies suggest that the problem is one of optimization, that is, maximum
enforcement and compliance at minimum cost.34
As is evident, transaction costs significantly influence the economics of civil disputes. Conventional law and economics analysis is a
helpful starting point for predicting litigation behavior. But first,
some terminology must be defined. Each action has a claim for injury,
and the estimated value of this injury as would be determined in a
judicial forum is hereinafter called the loss value. Because the trial
outcome in a meritorious action is uncertain, there is a probabilistic
32 Social efficiency must be distinguished from economic efficiency. The concept of
social efficiency does not turn on the correctness of a legal rule based on some normative
principle but instead refers to the idea that laws should be obeyed and that perfect compliance or enforcement should be the societal goal. Economic efficiency, on the other hand,
is defined as the allocation of resources in a way that maximizes value. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (7th ed. 2007). This suggests that laws maximize
economic efficiency. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
33 (1972) (arguing that function of negligence liability is to achieve cost-efficient level of
accidents and safety). In addition, proponents of economic efficiency propose that the law
should be violated if it inefficiently allocates resources. See Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Response to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1192 (1981) (“If a given act involves a violation of law,
penalties may follow. Managers’ duty calls for them to minimize the sum of penalty costs
and the cost of compliance with the rule.”).
33 Cash costs are primarily attorney fees and litigation costs. In many cases, however,
these costs are not the largest cost component in the resolution of a case. See Robert J.
Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 198–99 (2007).
Valuational discounts given by the parties as a result of the risk profile of the case can be
significant. These discounts are not seen as transaction costs because there is no cash
expense, unlike attorney fees. Rather, the discount is hidden because it is embedded in the
valuation. Id. at 199, 229.
34 A classic study of this problem is Gary Becker’s analysis of criminal enforcement and
sanctions. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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expectation of recovering this loss value. This probability multiplied
by the loss value is hereinafter called the expected value. Lastly, when
each party considers the future payoff or payout from trial, the
amount must be net of costs, such as attorney fees. The expected
value net of cost is hereinafter called the net value.
Conventional analysis predicts that the most important factor in
litigation behavior is the ratio of the expected value to the transaction
costs of prosecution or defense.35 In a dispute in which the American
rule applies, a plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is her net value.
She will not settle unless the amount offered by the defendant is at
least equal to the expected value of going to trial net of cost.36 Similarly, a defendant’s maximum settlement value is his net value. A
rational defendant would not settle for an amount greater than what
he stood to lose at trial, namely the expected value of the claim plus
the cost of defense.37 If the defendant’s net value at least equals the
plaintiff’s net value, there is a positive contract zone, and a settlement
is possible in the range between their net values. Settlement benefits
the parties by creating a surplus from transaction cost savings. But if
there is no positive contract zone, the parties cannot agree and trial
results.38 Numeric examples illustrate these propositions.
Case 1. The parties agree that the probability of the plaintiff’s
success is 0.5, the loss value is 100, and each party’s transaction cost is
40. The plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is the net value of 10.
The defendant’s maximum settlement value is the net value of 90.
The defendant’s maximum settlement value is greater than the plaintiff’s minimum settlement value. Trial would be wasteful since the
parties can settle at the expected value of 50. The spread between
their net values is the potential surplus, in this case, a cost savings of
80.
35 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417–18 (1973) (showing how prospect of settlement
depends on each party’s litigation expenses, settlement costs, and perceived expected value
of cost of judgment for plaintiff); Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22
STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (1969) (describing parties’ bargaining limits as function of expected
damage award; probability of award; and litigation, settlement, and opportunity costs).
Beyond this basic proposition, there is rich economic and legal literature, too voluminous
to cite comprehensively, on bargaining problems.
36 Posner, supra note 35, at 417–18.
37 Id. at 418; see also Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986) (“Most defendants are
unlikely to settle unless the cost of the predicted judgment, discounted by its probability,
plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are greater than the cost of the settlement
package.”).
38 See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 631–32 (2006)
(discussing conventional law and economics model).
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Case 2. Assume that the plaintiff views the probability of prevailing as 0.3. The transaction cost of 40 is greater than the expected
value of 30. The plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is anything
above 0 since the net value is –10. The defendant disagrees with the
plaintiff on the merits and believes that the plaintiff’s probability of
success is 0.1. The defendant’s maximum settlement value is 50. A
number of possibilities exist for settlement. One possibility is that,
with good information on the plaintiff’s assessment of her case, the
defendant will offer his view of the expected value, which is 10, and
thus he will enjoy a surplus of his attorney fee cost savings. Another
possibility is that he will offer 5, which is less than his view of the
expected value, and thus he will enjoy a rent of 5 derived from the
litigation cost structure. The plaintiff may accept these offers because
they are better alternatives than trial, which would result in a net
value of –10 for the plaintiff, but she must be willing to accept substantial reductions in compensation from her view of the expected
value of 30. Alternatively, she can pursue or signal a strategy of
brinksmanship and attempt to coerce the defendant into a higher settlement. The eventual outcome is indeterminate and depends on each
party’s negotiation skills and stomach for risk and gamesmanship.
Case 3. Assume now a frivolous case. The parties believe that
the plaintiff’s probability of success is close to zero. The plaintiff will
settle for any positive value. The defendant’s maximum settlement
value is his transaction cost of 40. A number of possibilities exist for
resolution of this dispute. One is that, as a repeat player concerned
about its reputation, the defendant may defend the action to deter
future frivolous plaintiffs. Another possibility is that the defendant
pays the plaintiff some positive value up to the cost of defense. In this
case, the plaintiff earns rent derived from the litigation system.
These simple illustrations show that the social problem of compliance and enforcement can be made more difficult by an expensive
litigation system.39 One problem is that when expected value is less
than the transaction costs of pursuing an action to trial, the prosecution of an action is uneconomical—why pursue a claim for one dollar
when it costs two dollars to litigate it? The cost structure of litigation
can preclude the prosecution of low value cases.40 Absent a positive
39 Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 62 (1996) (“We have designed a spectacular
system for adjudicating disputes, but it is too expensive to use.”).
40 To be clear, “low value” is not an absolute concept of some threshold dollar value
but rather refers to the ratio of the expected value to transaction costs. For example, a case
for injury of $100,000—a substantial sum—qualifies as a low value case if the expected
litigation cost is $90,000.
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settlement, a rational plaintiff may resolve a low value case by waiving
her right to recovery, though the law may provide a de jure opportunity for remedy.41 This in effect gives the defendant—the wrongdoer—substantial power to set his level of liability.42 For these types
of cases, merit is often dissociated from the decision to litigate a claim.
This does not mean that holders of low value cases are without
access to justice. Procedural mechanisms such as class action and consolidation were created to redress this persistent problem.43 But
access to justice through these mechanisms depends less on the merit
of any individual claim and more on the fortuity of finding an action
or similarly situated persons who can share the cost and risk. Many
potentially meritorious class or consolidated actions go unprosecuted
because of the high cost of searching out and organizing these actions.
Absent good fortune, the cost structure of the civil litigation system
excludes many cases based solely on a financial ratio.
Another problem is that the existing cost structure creates the
condition for frivolous litigation.44 In a world of zero transaction costs
41 See Rowe, supra note 19, at 889 (discussing expense of litigation as barrier to full
litigation of small claims). Scholars have noted that many meritorious claims for injuries
are not prosecuted. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1991) (“[C]laiming is a statistically unusual
behavior: many more injured people decline to claim—or never even consider claiming—
than attempt to activate the legal process.”); see also TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68–69 (2005) (noting that many meritorious medical malpractice claims
go unprosecuted); Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the
Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961) (observing that
most claims for injury in New York are never adjudicated in court); Michael J. Saks, Do We
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183 (1992) (“A great many potential plaintiffs are never heard
from by the injurers or their insurers.”). This empirical fact obviously undermines the
notion that a litigation compensation scheme such as tort law is economically efficient. See
Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 129–30, 167–69 (2008) (arguing that
theory of negligence cannot be economically efficient because of nonprosecution of injuries and undervaluation of plaintiff claims).
42 This is the precise situation in which a corporation commits low value infractions
against consumers, which makes individual lawsuits infeasible without fee shifting. Left
unprosecuted, the aggregate benefit from such repeated violations can result in great financial gain to the wrongdoer. The result is that rent can be earned from the litigation cost
structure, or the wrongdoer can select the level of its liability vis-à-vis society through the
political process.
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (required joinder of parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive
joinder of parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions); see also infra note 128 (providing
rationale for class actions).
44 As the term is used here, a frivolous suit has three essential elements: (1) The plaintiff knows or should know that the action has no merit; (2) the probability of success is in
fact very small; and (3) the plaintiff’s motive is to procure a positive settlement value. This
is the core of a Rule 11 inquiry. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (providing that by presenting
papers to court, attorney certifies that filing is not presented for improper purposes and is
supported by nonfrivolous legal arguments and factual contentions). A frivolous lawsuit
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(aside from one’s own effort), the only frivolous suits remaining would
result from either gross mistake or a large difference in the opportunity cost of effort between the parties such that the defendant would
pay to avoid this cost.45 But our current world of high transaction
costs enables the logic of frivolous litigation—a logic of extortion and
brinksmanship. A frivolous suit is valueless absent a credible threat of
harmful cost imposition from prosecution,46 and a determined plaintiff
can make such a threat, thereby coercing a defendant to pay for the
avoidance of greater financial harm. If a defendant is not subject to
repeat play consideration, he may rationally settle if settlement is
cheaper than litigation. Thus, the cost structure of the legal system
not only deters the pursuit of meritorious low value cases, it also provides no public incentive to defend frivolous actions outside of Rule
11 sanction, which is often cold comfort given that it requires adjudication on merit and motive.47
In summary, cost drives many of the decisions and strategies concerning prosecution and defense in a legal system. The problems of
unprosecuted low value disputes and frivolous suits can be seen as
bookends of the litigation spectrum. These cases are linked by a similar (but inverse) probabilistic profile, and both are governed by the
same dynamics of transaction costs. Each problem creates a different
form of social cost: underprosecution in low value cases and
overprosecution in frivolous suits. This result runs precisely opposite
to the societal interest since, ideally (disregarding the utopian possibility of perfect compliance), all frivolous suits should be deterred at
can also be brought to harass or annoy a party. Here, the problem of transaction costs may
be more peripheral; anyone willing to harass or annoy another at the cost of one’s own
attorney fees under the American rule may still do so under the English system if the ill
will is strong enough.
45 In a world of zero transaction costs, a great many frivolous suits might still be filed
because there is always the chance that the court might make a mistake and because the
opportunity to litigate would be cost free. But in such a system, the opportunity cost of
one’s effort provides the minimum cost barrier, which could reduce the number of frivolous suits to near zero if the plaintiff’s opportunity costs are greater than the expected
value of a mistake by the court.
46 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats To Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that defendant will not agree to
settle negative-net-value suits unless plaintiff’s threat to litigate is credible). Consider also
that insurers often pay a “danger value,” a premium in excess of the risk-neutral value, on
low probability claims involving death or serious injury. This is not because the insurer is
likely to be found liable but because the insurer seeks to avoid the possibility, however
slight, of high litigation payouts. ROSS, supra note 5, at 199–204.
47 See infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (discussing problems with overreliance on Rule 11 and similar court-imposed sanctions as means for deterring frivolous
suits).

May 2009]

TOWARD PROCEDURAL OPTIONALITY

529

inception or defended on the merits, and all meritorious actions
should be prosecuted.48
C. Wealth Effects of Fee Rules and Party Incentives
1. A Simple Model of Party Incentives
The effects of procedural rules on the value, cost, and risk of a
case deserve closer scrutiny. It is useful to set forth a simplified model
of two-party dispute resolution, as it provides a frame of reference for
subsequent discussion of attorney fee rules. For the remainder of this
Article, the following notations and value assignments are used:
V = each party’s view of net value
P = each party’s view of probability of liability
L = loss value (L = 100)
T = each party’s transaction costs (T = 20)
C = aggregate transaction costs (C = 2T = 40)
For simplicity, the loss value and transaction costs are fixed such that
L = 100, T = 20, C = 40 (see above). Holding these values constant
results in binary trial outcomes {100, 0}. This simplification reduces
the valuational variables to two: (1) each party’s probability assessment (and any rule that affects this calculation, such as the standard of
proof), and (2) the law’s assignment of the fee rule.
Under the American rule, the two probabilistic outcomes are a
win or a loss, both of which are net of one’s transaction costs. Under
the English rule, the outcomes are a win with fee indemnity or a loss
net of aggregate cost assignment. Under a one-way rule in which the
party stands to benefit from fee shifting (obviously one can also be on
the adverse side of a one-way fee shift), the outcomes are a win with
fee indemnity or a loss net of one’s transaction costs. The fee rules
can be formalized into the following payoffs and payouts under the
American and English rules and a beneficial one-way rule of fee
shifting, as laid out in Table 1 below. When discussing the defendant’s
payoffs and payouts, we also assume that defendants can enjoy the
benefit of one-way fee shifting upon prevailing, even though most
actually implemented one-way fee-shifting schemes are designed to
benefit plaintiffs rather than defendants.49

48 See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (discussing problems of social cost,
compliance, and enforcement).
49 See supra note 15.
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TABLE 1
American

English

One-Way

Plaintiff

Vp = PL – T

Vp = P(L + C) – C

Vp = P(L + T) – T

Defendant

Vd = PL + T

Vd = P(L + C)

Vd = P(L + T)

Without exception, a party favors a one-way rule to his benefit
and disfavors its reverse application. The application of the American
and English rules is symmetric, and a party’s preference between
these two fee rules depends on her probability of prevailing. If the
probability of prevailing is greater, a plaintiff would prefer the English
rule over the American rule. The plaintiff’s net value must be greater
under the English rule, since fee recovery is greater than fee liability if
the probability of success is more likely than not.50 A numeric
example illustrates the point. Assume that P = 0.6. The parties’ net
values are:
Plaintiff
Defendant

{ American
English
{ American
English

40 = PL – T = 0.6 × 100 – 20
44 = P(L + C) – C = 0.6(100 + 40) – 40
80 = PL + T = 0.6 × 100 + 20
84 = P(L + C) = 0.6(100 + 40)

The English rule increases the plaintiff’s net value from 40 to 44.
Concomitantly, the defendant’s net value decreases from 80 to 84 (a
decrease in net value because liability increases).
The opposite must also hold. If the probability of success is less
likely than not, the plaintiff prefers the American rule.51 For example,
assume that P = 0.4, and apply the above calculations. The plaintiff’s
minimum settlement values are {20 American, 16 English}, and the
defendant’s maximum settlement values are {60 American, 56
English}.52
In addition to changing net values, the English rule also produces
greater variance of expected outcomes. Under the American rule, the
plaintiff’s binary outcomes of net value are {80, –20}, either a win or a
loss net of one’s fees. The total spread of outcomes is 100, which is
the loss value at stake. Under the English rule, the plaintiff’s binary
outcomes of net value are {100, –40}. The total spread is 140, which is
50 We can show this algebraically: If P > 1 – P, meaning P > 0.5, then it must be true
that P(L + C) – C > PL – T. This inequality reduces to PC > T. Since P > 0.5, PC > T if
C = 2T.
51 If P < 1 – P, meaning P < 0.5, then it must be true that P(L + C) – C < PL – T. This
inequality reduces to PC < T if C = 2T.
52 The plaintiff’s calculations are as follows: PL – T = 0.4 × 100 – 20 = 20 (American
rule); P(L + C) – C = 0.4(100 + 40) – 40 = 16 (English rule). The defendant’s calculations
are as follows: PL + T = 0.4 × 100 + 20 = 60 (American rule);
P(L + C) = 0.4(100 + 40) = 56 (English rule).
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the loss value plus the aggregate cost.53 The preference for a particular fee rule is a function of the probability assessment, yielding different cost and net value. But the English rule always increases the
variance of outcomes (the potential deviation of actual result from the
probabilistic expectation)54 and thus the riskiness of a case.55
To summarize, the assignment of the fee rule has effects on each
party’s wealth that are similar to the effects of substantive entitlements. A plaintiff with a low probability or frivolous case would
prefer the American rule.56 Conversely, the party with a high
probability case would prefer the English rule. These clear preferences suggest certain policy prescriptions. Few would dispute that the
frivolous plaintiff should lose and be made to indemnify the cost of
the defendant. There is also a compelling case for fee shifting in favor
of a plaintiff with a very high probability case—one against a marginally frivolous defendant, perhaps. In the ideal world, then, an important consideration in the assignment of the fee rule is case merit.57
Thus far, we have assumed that this can only be done in public adjudication through the decision of the court.58 Outside of judicially
imposed sanctions such as Rule 11, which are aimed at abusive
behavior, the debate over the assignment of fee rules has focused pri-

53 Richard L. Schmalbeck & Gary Myers, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules Under
the Internal Revenue Code, 1986 DUKE L.J. 970, 977 (“[T]he clear effect of using the
English rule . . . is to increase each party’s stakes by the sum of both parties’ litigation
costs, not merely by the other party’s costs.”).
54 See Rhee, supra note 33, at 199 (“Thus, variance is defined as the measure of one’s
belief about the possible deviations of a judgment from expectation, and it gauges the
subjective perception of uncertainty.”).
55 Only when the probabilities are in equipoise does the expected value remain the
same under the American and the English rules. If P = 1 – P, meaning P = 0.5, the plaintiff’s returns are the same: P(L + C) – C = PL – T. The same is true for the defendant’s
returns: P(L + C) = PL + T.
56 See James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 249 (1995) (“The
English rule likely reduces the frequency of low-merit claims . . . .”); David Rosenberg &
Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1985) (“[U]nder the British system the willingness of the plaintiff to
litigate and to file a claim will be less than under the . . . American system if the likelihood
of prevailing is low.”).
57 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on
the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 371, 372, 374 (1996) (arguing that fee shifting should be based on adjudicated
case merit).
58 See, e.g., id. (requiring adjudication and judicial discretion in proposal to shift fees
based on case merit). But see infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (critiquing this
aspect of Bebchuck and Chang’s proposal).
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marily on distinguishing classes of cases based on policy considerations other than case merit.59
A last point is warranted. The economic model employed here is
highly stylized, and no serious person believes that dispute resolution
is so rationally programmatic. The empirical world is messy and
ambiguous. The economic model assumes information symmetry and
risk neutrality, meaning that the parties have the same information
and care only about expected return. It thus ignores both the potential range of deviation from expectation and the uncertainty arising
from imperfect information or process, which together define litigation risk.60 Risk is dismissed because conventional analysis assumes
the rational expectation model, that is, that “the subjective expectations correspond to the objective frequencies of the random event.”61
Of course, this model is unrealistic since “uncertainty is the essential
characteristic of a lawsuit,” and perhaps the principal motivator of litigation behavior.62
2. Party Incentives and Risk
The attorney fee rules affect not only the value and cost of an
action but also its risk. The English rule increases the variance of outcomes. The assumption of risk neutrality as a predictive matter is
facially absurd if one considers how parties actually behave, not only
in the context of litigation, but also in markets in general. Disputants
and market participants care greatly about risk. The capital and insurance markets, for example, exist precisely because people have dif-

59 It is of course true that even if a fee rule is made to apply to a certain class of cases
regardless of individual case merit within that class, prevailing on the merits is a condition
of a fee award.
60 In the context of litigation analysis, risk is defined as the degree of variance from
one’s expectation of the outcome, and variance is typically measured by one’s confidence
in one’s assessment of the case. Rhee, supra note 33, at 199, 217–19; Rhee, supra note 38,
at 679.
61 Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (1982); see also George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
9 (1984) (assuming existence of “true value” of litigation). Probability in legal assessment
is not a numeric, objective measure. It is a subjective, logical concept, allowing for differences in “ex ante degrees of rational belief in the plausibility of these decision paths, irrespective of the ex post result.” Rhee, supra note 38, at 653. I do not yet know a lawyer,
judge, or scholar who can consistently predict the outcomes of trials, and if a person were
to possess such a unique skill, she would certainly not be a lawyer, judge, or scholar for
long, as she would have retired long ago to her private island.
62 Rhee, supra note 33, at 215 (emphasis added); see also Rhee, supra note 38, at 665
(“The nature of litigation is stochastic . . . .”).

May 2009]

TOWARD PROCEDURAL OPTIONALITY

533

ferent views not only of the expected value of future income but also
of the risk associated with that income.63
We add complexity (and a dose of reality) by considering the
effect of risk on behavior. Market participants prefer to maximize
return and minimize risk. It is foolish to take unnecessary risk.64 Disputants in the litigation system also attempt to maximize return and
minimize risk.65 Risk management is common in capital markets,
insurance transactions, and gaming, and there is no reason to believe
that the benefits of risk management do not extend to litigation as
well. In a risk-based model of dispute resolution, disputants are seen
as constructing implied insurance/derivative transactions where risk
and return are traded.66 Thus, for example, when two disputants
share the same view of expected value but hold different opinions of
the range of variance, the party perceiving greater risk would value
the litigation asset less (and conversely the liability more) than the
other party when deciding whether to settle or litigate. He therefore
trades risk for a valuational concession in expected value, and this
implied hedging process creates divergent views on the value of the
asset/liability of the disputed right.67
63 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 268–71 (Dover 2006)
(1921) (noting that enterprise and markets exist because of uncertainty); see also BREALEY
ET AL., supra note 4, at 188–91 (discussing relationship between risk and return); SCOTT E.
HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 171–73 (2d
ed. 2004) (discussing why corporations purchase insurance).
64 For instance, diversification, a bedrock principle of financial economics, is preferred
because it obeys the rule that “the investor does (or should) consider expected return a
desirable thing and variance of return an undesirable thing.” Harry Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952).
65 See Rhee, supra note 33, at 237 (discussing relationship of risk and expected value);
see also J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 264, 272 (2005)
(noting that even if corporations could be presumed risk neutral because they are nonhuman entities, they can still behave in ways that reflect risk aversion).
66 See Rhee, supra note 33, at 229–39 (providing detailed analysis of this trading mechanism between parties).
67 A simple example illustrates this concept. Assume that trial outcome is binary. The
plaintiff believes that the outcomes are equally probable {100, 0}, that is, a win of 100 or a
loss yielding 0. The expected value is 50. The defendant has a different view of the binary
outcomes {25, 75}, that is, a guaranteed loss but of either 25 or 75. The defendant shares
the plaintiff’s assessment of the expected value of 50. Without considering risk, we expect
that the parties would settle at 50.
However, if the valuational framework takes risk into account, as is the case in the
financial and insurance markets, then the value is adjusted during the settlement process.
Clearly, the plaintiff believes the outcomes to be riskier, since there is greater variance in
her assessment. To mitigate risk, the parties will implicitly issue put options (or insurance
policies) to one another, providing, in essence, side payments in the event that the other
party experiences an adverse event. In the defendant’s case, he expects to pay out the
expected value of 50, but this value is subject to variation of up to 25. The insurance policy
thus has a face value of 25. The plaintiff issues the policy and in consideration receives a
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A risk-based analysis is relevant to the controversy concerning
the impact of the fee rule on litigation and settlement.68 Since the
English rule enhances net value if the probability of prevailing is
greater, some have argued that it promotes more trials.69 Others have
argued the opposite, reasoning that the possibility of an adverse fee
shift could result in a greater tendency to settle under the English
rule.70 Still others have argued that there is no clear discernable
effect.71
Without consideration of risk, the two rules should have the same
effect on trial and settlement. The principle of conservation of value
applies here.72 Each party’s net value may change with a change in
reciprocal policy of 25 from the defendant. But this policy only reduces the variance of
outcomes from {100, 0} to {75, 25}. There is still a residual risk.
To mitigate the risk further, the plaintiff must seek additional insurance from the
defendant. The defendant will issue an additional policy (that is, agree to settle, thus terminating the exposure to risk) but will do so only for additional consideration. The plaintiff must now give up some expected value for the issuance of additional insurance or a put
option by the defendant. Thus, the settlement value may and probably will, in many cases,
be less than the expected value. See id. at 233–37 (providing formal model of risk-adjusted
litigation valuation).
68 See POSNER, supra note 32, at 618 (“The most hotly debated question about [fee]
indemnity is its effect on the litigation rate, with its advocates touting indemnity as the
answer to the caseload crisis.”).
69 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage
Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 143 (1998) (“[T]he
English rule causes a greater number of cases to go to trial, and all of these additional cases
involve plaintiffs whose probability of prevailing is less than that of plaintiffs who go to
trial under the American rule.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology
of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 161 (1996) (“[B]y raising the stakes at trial, the loserpays system makes litigation itself more valuable and can discourage settlement.”); Shavell,
supra note 22, at 65 (“[T]he likelihood of trial under the British system will be greater than
under the American system.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. POSNER, supra note 32, at 618
(arguing that English rule promotes more trials when party believes it will prevail); Keith
N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives To Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069,
1079 (1993) (“[T]he British rule raises the stakes, which makes litigation more attractive to
the parties when the plaintiff places a higher estimate on the likelihood of his winning than
does the defendant.”).
70 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 159 (1984) (“[A]dding the possibility of a fee shift against individual
litigants relying on their own resources might well result in a greater tendency to settle
claims once pursued than exists under the American rule.”).
71 See Schmalbeck & Myers, supra note 53, at 976–77 (“[T]he incentive and disincentive effects of the English rule would seem, a priori, to be in rough equipoise.”).
72 This term is borrowed from the financial economic principle that the value of an
asset is preserved regardless of the nature of the claims against it (that is, the capital structure of the firm). BREALEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 448. This principle was announced in
seminal articles by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller. See generally Franco Modigliani
& Merton H. Miller, The Costs of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate
Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963). This
principle states that, absent bankruptcy costs and interest expense tax shields, the capital
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the fee rule (in other words, the nature of each party’s claim to the
economic pie—loss value plus aggregate cost—may change), but the
size of this pie remains the same in the sense that the fee rules do not
change the loss value or the contractual rate of the fees. The only
question is whether the rules affect the timing of settlement and thus
the amount of fees expended by promoting either settlement or trial.
However, since the rules affect only the allocation of fees, the
increased incentive to litigate for one party should be offset exactly by
an increased incentive to settle for the other party.
A numeric example illustrates this principle. In the above
example where P = 0.6, we calculated the parties’ values under the
American rule as {40 plaintiff, 80 defendant} and their respective
values under the English rule as {44 plaintiff, 84 defendant}. The contract zone under both rules is 40, which constitutes the surplus of
aggregate costs saved by settling rather than proceeding to trial. The
plaintiff’s increased net value under the English rule (from 40 to 44) is
exactly offset by the defendant’s willingness to pay an increased settlement (from 80 to 84). This implies that, barring other factors, attorney
fee rules should be irrelevant.
This conclusion, however, does not consider the effect of risk.
The English rule produces more variable returns. If one assumes that
most people are risk averse and strive to mitigate risk exposure,73 the
English rule may work at the margin to systematically push cases to
settlement. Since greater variance of outcome produces greater
opportunities to trade risk and return, we expect that disputants will
actively engage in risk mitigation measures, resulting in more opportunities for settlement. Importantly, the risk profiles of parties in any
given case typically will differ (that is, some parties are better
financed, are wealthier, are less risk averse, or can diversify risk
better), and the party who has an advantage in this regard under the
circumstances will gain a valuation advantage and will extract a price
concession from the other party in settlement.74
structure cannot change the value of a firm’s output. Stated differently, reconfiguration of
the capital structure cannot augment or diminish the value of the underlying economic
activity.
This principle is relevant in the litigation context. The rules governing attorney fees
do not change the loss value (the underlying liability), the contractual rate of fees, or the
amount of the attorney fees expended. The rules simply determine how cost is allocated
between the parties.
73 See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.) (“[M]ost people are assumed to be risk-averse in their serious financial
affairs . . . .”).
74 Rhee, supra note 41, at 181.
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In summary, the purpose here is not to suggest a definitive
answer to the controversy concerning which rule promotes settlement.
We can make educated guesses supported by theoretical arguments,
but ultimately the controversy probably will be laid to rest by empirical evidence.75 The point made here is the modest proposition that
assessing the value of a lawsuit requires a multivariate analysis. The
wealth effects of procedural rules influence the assignment of not only
cost but also risk, both of which affect value and strategy. Given the
fee rule’s influence, how should one apply it so as to advance the legitimate interests of the parties and society?
II
PROCEDURAL OPTIONALITY OF FEE

AND

PROOF RULES

A. Rules of Election
Given how attorney fee rules and standards of proof can affect
the net value of a case and the incentives of the parties, it is puzzling
that courts and lawmakers have not attempted to link them. Outside
of sanctions, fee rules are assigned based on the taxonomical organization of the policies underlying the cause of action; the standard of
proof has been based on the singular consideration of weight of
interest.76 The static nature of the assignment function means that
currently the rules are not efficacious mechanisms for shaping incentives and closing the divergence of private and social interests. This is
regrettable since procedural rules are fundamentally risk- and costallocation devices that the parties can use to negotiate more efficient
dispute resolutions.
The task should be to implement an incentive and deterrence
structure that optimizes enforcement and cost. To address this
problem and, more broadly, to demonstrate the efficacy of the concept of procedural optionality, this Article proposes a scheme in which
each party has the power to unilaterally shift fees to the other side as
long as she bonds her good faith belief by assuming a higher standard
of proof. At the outset, it is important to state the baseline assumptions. Under the proposal advanced here, the default state is assumed
to be the American rule of attorney fees and the preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof. The proposal here does not consider situa75 With regard to empirical evidence, differences in the legal systems and cultural and
political mores contribute to the litigation habits of those subject to the American and
English rules. Rowe observed that contrary attitudes explain the difference in the rules:
“The English seem to begin from an attitude that losers should naturally pay, while
Americans tend to want affirmative justifications to support fee shifts.” Rowe, supra note
15, at 654 n.13.
76 See supra Part I.A (providing background on fee rules and standards of proof).
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tions outside of these parameters, such as claims brought under
existing statutes providing for fee shifting. Additionally, this Article
should not be construed to promote a specific legislative agenda or
cause but instead to provide a conceptual framework for a more flexible procedural regime, which can then be considered in the context of
substantive rules and policies.
With that said, the rules of election proposed by this Article are
simple. In a two-party suit, there are two standards of proof and two
attorney fee rules available, leaving four possible combination
scenarios.
Scenario 1: Neither Party Elects. Absent some other laws, the
status quo remains, that is, the default standard of proof and the
American rule apply.
Scenario 2: Both Parties Elect. Both the default and heightened
standards of proof apply. Where either party proves its case under the
default standard, the American rule applies. The election of the
heightened standard becomes a nullity because both parties failed to
meet it. The consequence of bilateral fee shifting occurs only when
one party prevails under the heightened standard, in which case fees
are shifted to the loser. As discussed later in this Article, this scenario
should almost never occur once the parties have exchanged some
information through discovery.77
Scenario 3: Plaintiff Elects. The plaintiff unilaterally imposes
one-way fee shifting on the defendant, but she can only win by
proving her case under the heightened standard, upon which fees are
shifted to the defendant. This means that if she proves her case under
the default standard but fails to meet the heightened standard, she will
lose, though the defendant will not be entitled to fee shifting.
Scenario 4: Defendant Elects. The defendant unilaterally
imposes one-way fee shifting on the plaintiff, but he can only win by
proving his case under the heightened standard, upon which his fees
are shifted to the plaintiff. This means that if he fails to meet the
heightened standard, the plaintiff will win even if she fails to prove her
case under the default standard, though she will not be entitled to fee
shifting.
These simple rules of election and bonding allow the parties to
reorder the value, cost, and risk of a case based upon the incentives of
each party to maximize enforcement of a right at the lowest cost. The
following table summarizes these election rules and their
consequences.
77

See infra Part II.D.
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TABLE 2
Did the Party
Elect the
Heightened
Standard?
Plaintiff
No
Yes
Yes
No

Defendant
No
Yes
No
Yes

→

→
→
→
→

Can the Party Win
by Satisfying the
Default Standard?
(No Fee Recovery)
Plaintiff
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Defendant
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Can the Party Collect
Fees upon Winning
Under the
Heightened Standard?
Plaintiff
No
Yes
Yes
No

Defendant
No
Yes
No
Yes

These election rules provide a degree of symmetry in risk and
return, but the symmetry should not be overstated. While the rules
are symmetrical, the inherent roles of a plaintiff and a defendant are
different. Unless there is a legal presumption of some sort, such as the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence of each element of the cause of action.78 Because the plaintiff
bears this obligation, the defendant can prevail under different circumstances: The plaintiff can fail to present a prima facie case, which
would typically result in a summary judgment;79 the defendant can
negate an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case;80 or the defendant can prove an affirmative defense. The differences in the criteria
for prevailing ensure a certain degree of asymmetric risk and
burden.81 Accepting these differences, the above rules strive for symmetry of application, which is essential for fairness and acceptability.

78 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) (setting forth burden of
proof in negligence actions).
79 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding that summary judgment is warranted when party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial”).
80 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that defendant
moving for summary judgment must negate nonmoving plaintiff’s averment of facts).
81 Clearly, the substantive law can change these risk and burden allocations. For
example, burden shifting in tort law is common when policies call for the reallocation of
the risk of error. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (shifting
burden of proof on factual causation to defendant under theory of market share liability);
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 475 (Cal. 1970) (holding that “the burden of proof
on the issue of causation should be shifted to defendants to absolve themselves if they can”
when defendants failed to observe statute on swimming pool safety); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. m (1965) (“In the ordinary case the great majority of the
courts now treat res ipsa loquitur as creating nothing more than a permissible inference,
which the jury may draw or refuse to draw, unless the facts are so compelling that no
reasonable man could reject it.”); see also Robert J. Rhee, Probability, Policy and the
Problem of Reference Class, 11 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 286, 290–91 (2007) (arguing
that “systemic error” from interaction of procedural and substantive laws can require “normative correction” in substantive law).
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B. The Importance of Bonding Good Faith
If public adjudication is to rely on the parties’ input to determine
the degree of merit, and thus which fee rule to apply, we need a way
to penalize bad faith or failed performance. A scheme of optional
laws would quickly unravel into an anarchist’s impasse if there were
no mechanism by which to bond the parties’ good faith.82 The bond
must be priced correctly, meaning that the penalty should be proportional to the benefit of the option. If it costs too much, the option will
be uneconomical and the status quo will rule. If it costs too little, the
option will be exercised automatically, and a wholesale rearrangement
of the initial assignments of the procedural rules will result. For a
scheme of optional laws to work, there must be proportionality
between incentive and disincentive such that the effects of self-interest
and strategic behavior serve a normative social goal, or at least minimally conflict with it.
We can derive a set of bargaining rules by considering the scheme
of procedural election the parties would produce if they were ignorant
of their role in a subsequent litigation. We must ask: Would parties,
uncertain of their status as disputants, prefer to submit to an inflexible
rule or the discretion of the court, or would they prefer to choose the
application of rules themselves in each individual case? For most
people, control of the variables of outcome affecting one’s interest is a
good thing, particularly when there is little or no information on the
tendencies of the alternative adjudicator and process. Accepting this
premise, we must ask further: Given the problem of self-interest and
bonding, what would those rules of election be in a hypothetical
bargain?
The bonding aspect of procedural optionality facilitates better
conveyance of information. The act of election conveys the information that the electing party has significant information, is confident of
the completeness of the information such that variance is not a large
concern, and in good faith believes in his probabilistic assessment of
success. The value of this information communicated is high because
it is reliable. It is reliable because a party voluntarily imposes a substantial cost on himself to communicate it, namely the assumption of a
higher standard of proof.
82 This is the reason why substantive laws cannot be subject to election, for it is difficult
to imagine how parties could negotiate the terms of rights after the injury had already
occurred, when there had not been an initial assignment of the right. However, this does
not mean that substantive rules are not subject to ex ante contract analysis. See infra note
170.
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We can also see how an election would remove the “stickiness” of
a party’s contentiousness, that is, cases where parties continue to litigate to gain incremental advantage, even though they generally agree
on the factors of value and fully anticipate eventual settlement. The
stickiness of contentiousness arises from a desire to uncover
remaining unknowns, from the eternal hope for a better possibility.
An election could eliminate this common barrier to resolution by signaling a party’s good faith belief in the superiority of his claimed right.
If the parties generally agree on the factors of value, whether in
mutual dialogue or in private reflection, and the differences are now
minor, then the act of election and bonding could represent the final
confirmation of this understanding and, given the increased stakes,
prompt an expeditious settlement.
C. Judicial Administration
Any procedural innovation should be feasible and practical. A
few comments on judicial administration and working details of the
election scheme are needed at this juncture.
Simultaneous Disclosure. Fee shifting should apply only from the
point of election, and all previously accrued fees should not be recoverable. This encourages, or at least does not discourage, some degree
of information gathering and exploration of case merit. Simultaneous
disclosure of election is required to ensure procedural symmetry.
Serial disclosure produces unnecessary information asymmetry,
resulting in unfairness, gamesmanship, and costly judicial intervention. Since election is not an advisable choice in many instances, parties may coordinate simultaneous disclosure by producing joint
disclosures.83 Lastly, simultaneous disclosure is a safeguard. A party
can unilaterally disclose early. The benefit is the early accrual of fees
subject to shifting, and the detriment is obviously the strategic drawback of giving the opposing party information and tactical options.
Irreversibility of Choice. Once an election is made, it should be
irreversible. The bond of good faith is the assumption of a higher
standard of proof. A bond is useless if it can be canceled at will or
upon the occurrence of a callable event. In the same vein, an election
scheme would be meaningless, and quite costly, if the parties could
83 There are some game theoretic possibilities when a party rejects joint disclosure, but
the strategies and outcomes are contextual and not subject to general observation. For
example, without knowing the context, it is impossible to deduce how a party would or
should construe the opposing party’s refusal to enter into a joint disclosure of nonelection.
The possibilities are that the opposing party intends to elect, is unsure about election, is
positioning for settlement leverage, is enjoying gamesmanship, or is simply incompetent.
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petition to change their elections because subsequent developments
prove the original election to have been unwise.84
Factfinding. From the perspective of judicial administration,
working with two standards of proof should not be an issue, as trial
and appellate courts routinely do this. The application of two standards of proof requires particular findings of facts. A court can
administer this task through either a special verdict form or a modified general verdict form.85 The factfinder may be required to apply
different standards of proof to different parties, claims, and defenses.
This is a more complex task than the uniform application of the
default standard. Nevertheless, there are many cases in which the
factfinder is required to do this, for example, cases involving punitive
damages.86 With assistance from the court by way of clear jury
instructions, the factfinder is capable of parsing parties, claims, and
defenses under different standards of proof.
As usual, a factfinder should have wide latitude in deciding cases
under an election scheme. Given its broad prerogative, it could view
the plaintiff’s failure to present a prima facie case under the default
standard as a defendant’s win by clear and convincing proof, that is,
the defendant’s heightened standard. But this is unlikely. In most
cases, a plaintiff’s failure to prove a case under the default standard, in
and of itself, should not result in a conclusion that the defendant satisfied his burden of proving no liability under the heightened standard.
Where there are several possibilities of past occurrence with different
legal consequences attached to each theory of the case, the failure to
prove a prima facie case under one party’s theory does not necessarily
mean that the negative proposition has been proven to the exclusion
of other possibilities. For the defendant to win under a heightened
standard, he should present affirmative evidence of no liability. This
can be evidence disproving the plaintiff’s theory of the case, coupled
with the plaintiff’s failure to carry her burden under the default standard, or evidence proving an affirmative defense under the heightened standard. Thus, the nature of the parties’ obligations in the
litigation system does not fundamentally change under the election
scheme proposed here—the plaintiff must prove her case and dis84 Of particular concern is satellite litigation over whether a party should be allowed to
change his mind. Cf. George Cochran, The Reality of “A Last Victim” and Abuse of the
Sanctioning Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 693 (2004) (noting that fee shifting under
Rule 11 creates incentives for satellite litigation). Satellite litigation seeking to undo a bad
choice is precluded if an election is irreversible as a matter of law.
85 See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)–(b) (allowing special and general verdict forms).
86 See supra notes 26–27 (providing examples of use of heightened standard in various
contexts).
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prove the defendant’s defenses under the chosen standard, and the
defendant has the opposite burden.
Multiclaim Suits. In a two-party, multiclaim litigation, there is no
reason why each claim and defense should not be subject to per claim
election rather than per party election. Election per claim is the
better rule because the parties can more finely allocate the risks and
returns of each claim and defense. This scheme promotes efficiency
by incentivizing the settlement or dismissal of marginal claims and
defenses. The start of a simple action can often devolve into a fusillade of charges and countercharges, many of which are marginal. The
possibility of fee shifting on each claim and defense would deter
shotgun litigation tactics. Obviously, the administration of a multiclaim action would be more complex. Individualized election makes
the task of sorting facts, evidence, and evidentiary standards more difficult. Also, where two claims are tried and each party wins on different claims, the court must shift fees on a per claim basis. This raises
the specter of litigation on attorney fees, increasing the cost of an
action. But such litigation is common whenever there is fee shifting.
Given the extent of the social cost from frivolous actions and unprosecuted meritorious actions,87 an educated guess is that on balance, the
benefit of deterrence of frivolity through fee shifting outweighs the
added administrative cost.
Multiparty Suits. The complexity in a multiparty litigation may
make an election scheme ultimately infeasible. There are myriad
potential Gordian knots and contradictions. Consider a simple
example: Plaintiff A sues defendants B and C, who were allegedly
acting in concert.88 A elects against B but not against C because she
believes that she has a better claim against B in the event a factfinder
finds that the defendants were not acting in concert. But C elects
against A. At trial, A loses against B, even though the jury finds that
B and C were acting in concert and that there was a preponderance of
the evidence to support liability against both. It also finds that C
failed to prove his defense under the heightened standard. The end
result is that A loses as to B, despite the preponderance of the evidence against B, but wins against C. Assume that joint and several
liability attaches to parties who injure a person while acting in concert.
Can C seek contribution from B? Clearly, this situation involves the

87

See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 400–01 (Okla. 1958) (holding that defendants who aided or abetted harmful act are liable).
88
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interplay of the election scheme with other areas of the law,89 leading
to complexity and uncertainty.
This simple hypothetical illustrates the many potentially thorny
situations that can confront parties and courts in multiparty litigation.
The complexity of multiparty, multiclaim litigation increases nonlinearly with additional claims and parties.90 The administrative cost
associated with resolving such complexity outweighs the benefits of
private ordering. The potential to destabilize well-established rules of
law in other areas is high, and the resulting uncertainty would introduce more cost into an already costly litigation system. When the pros
and cons are weighed, the election scheme may well be inappropriate
for multiparty litigation. With that said, it is plausible that given the
social benefits, an election scheme could be applied in relatively
simple multiparty litigation, though this category is easier to conceptualize than to realize. Such a decision should be made at the discretion of the court with appropriate input from the parties. We suspect,
however, that a consensus among the court and parties would be difficult to reach, and as a practical matter, the application to multiparty
suits would be difficult.
Timing of Election. The timing of the election is perhaps the
most crucial administrative matter. There are two competing policies
at work. On the one hand, parties should make their election with the
most complete information possible. Discovery produces information
and generally results in a diminishment of factual ambiguity.91 It is
not unusual to see many attorneys and clients reluctant to settle early
when there is significant factual ambiguity, choosing to settle only
after some discovery is had. This policy consideration suggests that
election should be made at the end of discovery but before any adjudication, including summary judgment.
On the other hand, all else being the same, the parties should
minimize transaction costs. The completion of discovery is perhaps
the most costly cash expenditure in litigation. If an election is made at
the end of discovery, the scheme would have less influence on the goal
of cost mitigation. A court must also be cognizant of the unintended
consequence that, to bolster the possibility of proving their cases
89 Even a two-party litigation could involve issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel
if there is a potential party not involved in the litigation.
90 Economists have noted that the transaction costs of negotiating an outcome increase
as the number of participants increases. See Demsetz, supra note 30, at 354–55 (“Negotiating costs will be large because it is difficult for many persons to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, especially when each hold-out has the right to work the land as fast as he
pleases.”).
91 But see infra note 118 (noting that some scholars hold that egocentric interpretation
of facts by parties will cause beliefs to diverge rather than converge).
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under the heightened standard, parties electing to shift fees would be
motivated to engage in more unwise discovery—unwise given the
marginal cost. This problem is a lesser concern in frivolous and low
value cases because the merits are clearer.
The balance of these competing policies suggests that an election
should be made at some time during discovery. The discovery plan
and the timing of election would be subject to the court’s discretion.
The court could bifurcate discovery. The first stage allows the parties
to gather sufficient information to make an informed election, though
certainly not with perfect information. Upon completion, the parties
would make their election and then proceed to the second stage,
which would focus on proving their case under the elections made.
Lastly, note the role of information. If there is significant information asymmetry, or symmetry with completeness of information,
there is a distinct possibility that a party with a high degree of
favorable information, such as the defendant in a frivolous suit or a
plaintiff in a low value case, may choose to elect early in order to lock
in fee shifting before expensive discovery is undertaken.
D. Conditions of Election
An election materially changes the prospects of a case, and thus
the decision to elect is no small matter. The decision is a complex
calculus. It is clear that the exercise of the option would not be standard fare in litigation strategy. In the vast majority of meritorious
disputes, the parties would maintain the procedural status quo. Several factors would determine the likelihood of election: (1) the ratio
of loss value to transaction costs, (2) a party’s probability assessment,
(3) several aspects of risk allocation, (4) a party’s risk preference, (5)
the level of information available, and (6) attorney incentives. These
factors are discussed in order.
Ratio of Loss Value to Transaction Costs. The importance of this
ratio is intuitively obvious. As the loss value increases, the transaction
costs become less influential in the calculation of net value. The dispute becomes more sensitive to disagreements on the probability of
success and expected value.92 All else being the same, a $1 million
case is more likely to go to trial than a $100,000 case because a small
degree of difference in views in the former case can still result in a
large disputed amount that may exceed the cost of litigation. One is
less inclined to elect a higher standard as the loss value increases
92 See Posner, supra note 35, at 419 n.29 (“There is empirical evidence that higher
stakes do increase the likelihood of litigation.”).
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because the reduction in expected value associated with a higher standard of proof tends to offset the increase in potential fee recovery.
A numeric example illustrates the point. Assume that L = 100,
T = 10, and P = 0.6. The ratio of loss value to transaction costs is 10x.
Under the American rule, the plaintiff’s net value is 50, calculated as:
V = PL – T = 0.6 × 100 – 10. Suppose the plaintiff elects, but the
defendant does not; thus, the plaintiff arranges a one-way fee shifting
scheme. The imposition of a higher standard of proof necessarily
means that probability of success is diminished, though the quantum
depends on the unique circumstances of each case. Assume, for
example, that the probability decreases to P = 0.5 due to the assumption of the heightened standard. Under the payoff formula for a oneway fee shifting, the plaintiff’s net value is now 45, calculated as:
V = P(L + T) – T = 0.5(100 + 10) – 10. An election would result in a
lower net payoff for the plaintiff.
Consider now a case in which the transaction costs are higher:
L = 100 and T = 25. The ratio of loss value to transaction costs is 4x.
Here, cost influences the party’s decision and strategy more. If
P = 0.6, the plaintiff’s net value under the American rule is 35, calculated as: V = PL – T = 0.6 × 100 – 25. Assume that the plaintiff elects
and the probability decreases to P = 0.5 again. The net value of a oneway fee shift is now 37.5, calculated as: P(L + T) − T = 0.5(100 + 25) − 25.
An election would result in a higher payoff.
These illustrations show that an election is more likely when the
ratio of loss value to cost is lower, because the benefit of fee indemnity tends to offset the cost of diminished expected value and vice
versa. Since smaller cases tend to have lower ratios of loss value to
cost, they would generally enjoy a systematic benefit from the election
scheme proposed (all else being the same).
Probability and Expected Value. A shift to a higher standard of
proof always lowers the probability of prevailing, and thus the
expected value. Imagine how the expected value of a civil action
diminishes if the standard of proof changes to the criminal standard.
A party would only elect if the reduction in the expected value, due to
a decrease in the probability of liability, is exceeded by the expected
gain from the recovery of fees.93 Let us continue with the preceding
93 We can represent this algebraically. For a plaintiff, an election to the heightened
standard would result in the following: The value changes from the American rule, as
represented by V = PL – T, to a one-way fee shifting scheme of V’ = P’(L + T) – T, where
V’ is the new net value under the lower probability P’ attributable to a heightened standard. A plaintiff would only elect if the new net value is greater than the old net value,
such that V’ > V. Substituting terms, we get the following inequalities:
P’(L + T) – T > PL – T, or equivalently P’T > L(P – P’). This last inequality says that
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example. It shows that upon election, the plaintiff’s net value
increases from 35 to 37.5 even as probability decreases from P = 0.6 to
0.5. If the probability decreased further to P = 0.48, the net value
would be 35, calculated as: P(L + T) – T = 0.48(100 + 25) – 25. The
net value under the one-way fee shifting would be exactly equal to the
status quo under the American rule, suggesting that P = 0.48 is the
indifference point between the status quo and election (assuming risk
neutrality). Any further reduction in probability below this threshold
would result in a diminishment of net value. Thus, an electing party
must carefully consider the relationship between fee recovery and
reduction in expected value due to a higher standard of proof.
Aspects of Risk Allocation. By changing the standard of proof
and the attorney fee rules, an election fundamentally changes the risk
profile of a case. It not only lowers probability but can also increase
the riskiness of a case outcome. Unless a party has brought an absolutely frivolous lawsuit (certainty of loss) or has bribed the judge and
jury (certainty of win), there is always a range within which one’s
probability estimate may deviate from expectation. Two sets of facts
and laws can produce the same probability assessment from the parties, but parties may assign different confidence levels to that assessment based on their perception of the completeness or ambiguity of
information.94 Thus, for any given assessment there is a margin of
error.
The case outcome may be more sensitive to variance (potential
deviations from one’s expected value) at certain levels of probability
than at others. The intuition is that high probability cases are less
sensitive to the same level of variance than close cases.95 In the
former situation, even if one is uncertain of the precise location of the
decision standard, there is a significant margin of error such that relatively small miscalculations do not affect the overall result. In the
latter, a small deviation from expectation can change a close win to a
close loss. The case is more sensitive to variations in expectation.96
There is another aspect to the risk analysis. Risk can be measured as the variance of net values under different fee rules. Under a
election is expected when the anticipated gain in transaction costs P’T is greater than the
reduction in expected value L(P – P’).
94 See Rhee, supra note 38, at 653–61 (providing example and analysis of how weight
of, variance of, and confidence in one’s probability assessment can influence party’s choice
and strategy).
95 See Priest & Klein, supra note 61, at 16–19 (providing model showing that
probability and variance are important to each party’s expectation of outcome and case
value).
96 See Rhee, supra note 38, at 635 n.67 (providing numeric example of Priest and
Klein’s concept).
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one-way fee shifting scheme, where only one party elects, the range of
returns is skewed in favor of the electing party. This change in risk is
positive and thus always beneficial to the electing party. As discussed,
however, a shift from the American to the English rule always causes
the range of payoffs and payouts to be wider. Thus, a bilateral election results in greater variance of returns.
In sum, fee shifting increases the risk in several important
respects. There is variance of returns, which is not a good thing for a
risk-averse party, unless the variance increases only on the upside, as
would be the case in one-way fee shifting. But more problematic is
the influence of risk on one’s confidence. A party must be satisfied
that a substantial reduction in probability would still yield a win, and
as the probability decreases, a party would be more sensitive to potential deviations from expected value. This suggests that a party would
elect only when the level of information is high, providing greater confidence in the estimates of probability and risk.
Risk Preferences. A risk-neutral party conducts a single variable
calculation based solely on how a decision affects the probabilistic
outcome. But in a scheme in which the standard of proof and
attorney fee shifting is optional, there is not a single expected value.
As discussed, the essential financial calculus is whether the reduction
in probability is offset by the potential gain of fees in the event of a
win.97 This is a more difficult assessment because it requires a second
probability analysis and a relative comparison of the two net values.
As for non-risk-neutral parties, there are several additional considerations. Although a one-way fee shifting skews the range of outcomes upward in one’s favor, the probability of success must decrease
because of the higher standard of proof. Under the American rule, a
risk-averse party may choose a lower net return with a higher
probability of winning than a higher net return under a one-way rule.
In other words, the risk-averse party may not equate the same probabilistic expectations of net values under different fee rules, but in fact
may value a higher probability of success (expected value) more than
the total expected return (net value). The consideration for a riskseeking party is the opposite: A risk-seeking party would sacrifice a
quantum of return to opt for the more risky choice. Thus, for both the
risk-averse and the risk-seeking parties, there is a point at which the
risk and net value are at equilibrium and they are indifferent as to the
valuational consequences of election.

97

See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
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Level of Information. The most important problem in dispute
resolution concerns information acquisition and asymmetry.98 Information, the basis of valuation, is costly to acquire. It would be foolish
for any party to attempt a valuation based on limited knowledge, and
one suspects that the loud, if not cacophonous, complaints of irrational or inefficient behavior in the litigation system are based largely
on ex post assessments of outcomes that are the product of necessarily
imperfect ex ante predictions and decisions occurring in a state of
uncertainty about future outcomes.99 The process of valuation is the
incorporation of all available information. In a world of uncertainty, a
sufficient level of information produces confidence in one’s valuation.
Only when there is proper pricing can parties engage in a more precise dialogue and effectively resolve a dispute.100
In this cloud of uncertainty, the effect of self-interest diminishes
the quality of information flow. It is certain that parties are never
neutral and that they always want to win. A party will disclose information only if it is mandated or serves one’s interest, or at least this is
the strong presumption. Typically some degree of information asymmetry exists. The parties are uncertain as to the level of information
that would constitute full disclosure of all knowable facts (for practical
purposes, a state of perfect information).
Many years ago, Frank Knight distinguished the concepts of risk
and uncertainty: risk connoting a future state of known distribution,
and uncertainty connoting a future state of unknown distribution or
imperfect information.101 A similar concept is applicable in the case
of information asymmetry. Even when there has been full disclosure,
there may be trepidation as to the level of uncertainty. A party with
less information can never be certain that the opposition has disclosed
all information. Imagine how simple negotiation would be if parties

98 Some of the most important economic concepts of the past thirty years have been
information dispersion and uncertainty. Interview with Prof. Kenneth Arrow, Stanford
University, in Three Nobel Laureates on the State of Economics, CHALLENGE, Jan.–Feb.
2000, at 6, 13, 19–20.
99 See supra note 61. Too often, scholars, policymakers, and judges apply a hindsight
bias to difficult decisions when they have no stake in the value, cost, and risk. “Once the
outcomes are observed, it usually is easy to say what would have been the best decision.”
HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 63, at 35. Likewise, in a casino or the capital markets, it is easy to assess strategies of value, cost, and risk when there is nothing at stake
other than one’s own mental accounting of what one would have done.
100 See Rhee, supra note 38, at 653–61 (discussing interplay of parties’ confidence
regarding projections and settlement decisions).
101 KNIGHT, supra note 63, at 233–34.
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could somehow read each other’s minds.102 But of course, uncertainty
and strategic behavior are facts. Nor can we attribute to disputants
the unnatural quality of omniscience for the purpose of normative
prescription.103 Thus, the road to achieving a level of information
parity must be paved with mandatory disclosure rules and the
attendant expenditure of transaction costs.
At each point in the process of litigation, the risk perceived is a
function of the available information, the perceived unknowns and
unknowables, and the expected amount of future disclosures to be
made through the litigation process. When a lawsuit is filed, the level
of known information is typically low. Under modern pleading doctrine, a party need not engage in extensive discovery to file a pleading.
Unless specifically mandated,104 the doctrine does not require particularized averments.105 It only requires a “short and plain” statement of
the claims and defenses,106 which can be contradictory without violating ethical obligations.107 Although a party is subject to the good
faith obligation of Rule 11, he is not judged on ex post accuracy but on
ex ante reasonableness.108 As litigation moves from the pleading to
discovery stage, the level of information generally increases.109
Because the difference in the level of information between
pleading and post-discovery is substantial, the risk is generally much
higher in the early stages of litigation.110 Only upon final judgment is
there certainty. Before this, probability is based on the information
available. The unknown and the awareness of it have no effect on

102 This condition would represent a state of perfect information, that is, a state of perfect knowledge by all exchangers of products. Id. at 86. “If intercommunication is actually
perfect, exchanges can take place at only one price.” Id. at 82.
103 “It can never be assumed that parties should try to accurately predict the decision of
the deliberative body because this assumes a level of predictive power beyond the credible
allowance of a rational person.” Rhee, supra note 38, at 664; see also supra note 61 (discussing rational expectation model).
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), 23.1(b)(3).
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), (b)(3), (b)(5).
106 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), (b)(1)(A).
107 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(3).
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). See generally Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the
Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1996)
(arguing that frivolous cases under Rule 11 are not necessarily meritless, but instead are
generally believed by plaintiffs ex ante to be reasonable “long shots” with low, but not
zero, probability of success).
109 See Rhee, supra note 38, at 676–78 (showing effects of progress of litigation on parties’ level of uncertainty).
110 See id. at 676 & n.246, 677 (showing that with limiting assumptions, valuational
impact of new information is subject to declining marginal utility curve).
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probability since it cannot be assigned a probabilistic value.111 As the
litigation progresses, we expect a random walk of probability as previously unknown information is discovered.112 Thus, probability is
always subject to variance, whose range is determined by each party’s
perception of the degree of the unknown and unknowable
information.
Consider, then, two different sets of circumstances in which the
probabilities are the same, except that the level of uncertainty differs,
as in pre- and post-discovery states of case assessment. In the prediscovery scenario, the probability is high, but the uncertainty is high
as well. As a result, the high expectation of positive outcome is tempered by the reality that it is subject to a greater range of variance
from expectation. At the lower range of this variance, the party could
lose because the case falls short of the court’s decision standard
demarking the boundary between liability and no liability, and this
loss is within the range of expectation when one considers the large
variance due to uncertainty. In the post-discovery scenario, one
would have more confidence, and the spectrum of variance would be
tighter with the same measure of high probability as before discovery.
Here, the lower end of the spectrum of variance could exceed the
court’s decision standard if the variance is low enough such that the
high probability is coupled with greater confidence in this estimate.
The point is that a party would be ill advised to elect a higher
standard of proof under the condition of low information. Where the
level of information is high, such as at the end of discovery, rational
parties have greater confidence in their views. If the parties view the
case similarly and the risks have been sufficiently mitigated through
some discovery, the parties most likely will end up settling the case.
Barring the utility of gambling, a high level of information is an essential condition for election.113 This implies four aspects of election pertaining to the relationship between information and risk.
First, the timing of an election is important. An election is more
likely when there is a high degree of disclosed information. A
probability assessment in the early stages of litigation, even if it suggests that the English rule is better at that point in the litigation pro-

111 For example, the parties anticipate deposing a witness whose proposed testimony is
unknown to the parties. This unknown factor cannot affect probability because the parties
cannot assign it a value. Id. at 654.
112 Id. at 664–66.
113 See Priest & Klein, supra note 61, at 17 (“In litigation, as in gambling, agreement
over the outcome leads parties to drop out.”).
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cess, would be subject to a low degree of confidence.114 Election
under such a condition would generally be speculation rather than an
informed choice.
Second, if information asymmetry exists, the party with better
information is more likely to elect, particularly when he knows that
the opposition is substantially disadvantaged. From the point of view
of the electing party, she would want the option to elect, but not have
an election against her, particularly if the opponent’s election is based
on sound case assessment and information. Therefore, as a general
proposition, unilateral fee shifting based on asymmetric information
advantage is always better than bilateral fee shifting based on completeness and symmetry of information between the parties. An election puts significant pressure on the other party, who lacks the same
degree of information, which may result in that party decreasing its
settlement value.
Third, election may serve an important signaling function that
conveys essential information about the parties’ assessments, confidence level, and evidence. Because an election is bonded, the level of
noise in this signal is low and the information quality is high.
Lastly, a high probability, low variance case is more likely to see
election. A good example is a case of negligence for the amputation
of a wrong limb or organ. Liability in these cases is clear, and if there
is a dispute, it is usually over damages. Although the parties usually
settle these cases (because they would generally agree on the issue of
liability and because the risk is low), election provides a substantial
benefit. The compensation to the injured party would then be whole,
as attorney fees do not subtract from the recovery.
Attorney Incentives. The interest of the attorney must be considered in any procedural reform. Litigation is a team production
between attorney and client. In matters of strategy, the attorney plays
the predominant role. Although the attorney is bound by the rules of
ethics to consider the best interest of the client, she is nevertheless an
agent in a principal-agent relationship. Economists tell us that there is
no perfect agent.115 The attorney’s interests are simple: She wants to
be paid and does not want to lose the case. The interest in the former
is strictly her interest, while the interest in the latter is mixed. Obviously, winning a case serves the client, but it also serves the attorney’s
interest. These interests are intimately related. Winning enhances the
114 See Rhee, supra note 33, at 240 (“Confidence is intimately linked to the perception
of risk.”); Rhee, supra note 38, at 653–55 (explaining that confidence and risk are correlated in that low risk results in higher confidence in one’s expectation).
115 See JENSEN, supra note 11, at 5 (“[P]eople will not act in the interest of others (their
principals or partners) to the exclusion of their own preferences.”).
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attorney’s reputation, increases the possibility of repeat business from
the client, and in a contingent fee arrangement, assures fees.
The interests of the attorney and client can diverge. The client
seeks maximum recovery at the lowest cost. This may result in a preference for election, which lowers the probability of success but
increases the net value. But the attorney will generally not prefer this
choice. Under a contingent fee agreement, the likelihood of recovery
is reduced, but the judgment for damages from which the fee is taken
remains the same. This reduces the attorney’s economic incentive.
Under an hourly fee arrangement, the fees presumably do not change;
only the paying party changes. If there is no difference in the credit
quality of the paying party, the attorney has no economic incentive to
prefer election, and she faces the prospects of an increased chance of
losing the case. We expect that the disincentive toward election would
flow through to the attorney’s advice to the client, though it would be
improper to suggest that agent self-interest always or even frequently
overrides the agent’s fidelity and duty to her client’s interests.116
Notwithstanding the agent’s conflict, there are several circumstances in which an attorney would have an economic incentive to
elect the heightened standard. First, in the case of frivolous action,
the defense counsel may not be so concerned with the prospect of
losing, even under a higher standard of proof, and a successful defense
of the client’s case under an even higher standard of proof may burnish the attorney’s reputation, as well as provide an opportunity for
repeat business. Second, an attorney may have an economic incentive
for election if an election creates the possibility of a new business
opportunity. That new business opportunity is the low value case.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a plaintiff has
clearly suffered an injury worth $25,000 but would have to expend
$50,000 in legal fees to bring the action in court. In this case, the possibility of fees, though risky, is better than the certainty of no fees.
These cases would ordinarily not be prosecuted absent a class action
or consolidation. The possibility of fee shifting opens up a class of
traditionally excluded or marginalized cases.117 Here, the interests of
the attorney and client align more closely, as each seeks the pursuit of
a common opportunity.

116 See id. (noting that rational self-interest is frequently misinterpreted to mean pathological selfishness with no leeway in preference for well-being of others).
117 See infra Part III.B (providing more analysis of impact of election scheme on high
probability, low value suits).
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***
It is helpful to summarize the conditions of election. Clearly, an
election fundamentally changes the essential attributes of a case.
Most cases will not result in election. Parties will be wary of exercising the option, particularly where the attorney incentives militate
against an election. An election necessarily reduces the expected
value of a case (because it reduces the probability of winning), and
there is an economic benefit only if the benefit of fee indemnity outweighs the diminishment of expected value. Also, an election reconfigures the risk profile of a case. Parties will elect only when there is
high confidence in their assessment of the case, which is correlated to
a high level of probability and information. This set of unique conditions is met in two types of cases—low value actions and frivolous
suits.
Since a high probability of success is a natural condition of election, we can fairly predict that the English rule will be seldom invoked
through bilateral choice once discovery has commenced. For this to
occur, both parties must believe the probability of success is high and
must have a high degree of information such that the perceived risk is
low. Although rational parties can disagree about predicted outcomes
and interpretations of facts and laws, and such disagreements can
easily lead to trial without normative condemnation that the trial is
the result of some “error,”118 it is unlikely that disagreement on
probability and information is so stark as to result in bilateral election.
The most likely situation is no election at all in the vast majority
of cases, resulting in the status quo of the American rule and the
default standard of proof. An election by one party is likely in a small
but socially significant class of cases, resulting in potential one-way fee
shifting. Lastly, bilateral election, resulting in the potential application of the English rule if one party meets the heightened standard of
proof, would almost never occur so long as the timing and structure of
the election scheme are adequately planned, as discussed above.119

118 See George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information
Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (2004) (“[S]hared information, if open to multiple interpretations, is likely to be interpreted egocentrically by the
disputants, which can cause beliefs to diverge rather than converge.”).
119 See supra Part II.C.
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III
IMPLICATIONS OF A BONDED UNILATERAL FEESHIFTING REGIME
A. Frivolous Lawsuits

The policy implications of frivolous lawsuits are broad.120 There
is a common perception, right or wrong, that the justice system entertains too many frivolous actions.121 The responses to frivolous actions
largely have been consistent, differing only in the details. Aside from
the occasional calls for greater professional responsibility and
ethics,122 most scholarly analyses have focused on fee shifting when a
case is determined by the court to be frivolous.123
We can refine the problem further. To the extent frivolous
actions are a systemic problem, they are most problematic in the early
phases of litigation. They rarely go to trial, and the problem is the
occurrence of needless cost in the beginning, followed by an extortionate settlement or dismissal later. Cases that are determined to be
meritless only after discovery are not problematic. We should not
make an ex post judgment on an ex ante decision, particularly in a
system of notice pleading, for any reason other than to judge whether
the decision to file suit was reasonable.124 In this light, the proposition
120 The problem of deterring frivolous lawsuits is much discussed in the literature. See
generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997) (proposing model of sanctioning frivolous litigation); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397 (1993)
(same).
121 See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 96
(1992) (noting that research revealed “the widespread impression among jurors that the
civil litigation system is overburdened by claimants seeking awards in meritless cases”).
But see Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 459 (2004) (“Although excessive litigation is the pathology dominating public discussion and policy agendas, systematic research
reveals that the more serious problems are undercompensation of victims and overcompensation of lawyers.”).
122 See generally Neal H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300 (1986)
(arguing that greater professional standards should mitigate frivolity).
123 See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 57, at 371–72 (proposing that courts should have
power to shift fees based on adjudicated “margin of victory”); Nathalie D. Martin, Fee
Shifting in Bankruptcy: Deterring Frivolous, Fraud-Based Objections to Discharge, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 97, 103 (1997) (proposing that bankruptcy courts should have power to impose
fees for improper objection to discharge).
124 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (stating that by presenting pleading to court, attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that “the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery” (emphasis added)).
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that the court should adjudicate the issue of frivolity assumes that it is
the most competent decisionmaker to conduct this inquiry.
Stated differently, this view assumes that the court should determine the issue of frivolity because it is either neutral or best informed
among all participants. The second explanation is simply wrong, as
the court, being the most removed from the activities giving rise to the
dispute, is the least informed and last to know. The only justification
then is that the court is a neutral arbiter, a rather uninspiring reason
given its inherent lack of knowledge and the cost associated with
achieving some degree of information parity with the parties. Indeed,
this reason makes clear that the function of a court is somewhat fungible, as demonstrated by the prominence of arbitration and other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as substitutes for public
adjudication.
In truth, the parties are in the best position to recognize a frivolous suit. This is obvious since frivolity implies knowledge; a truly
frivolous case is brought by a plaintiff who knows she has no legitimate chance of success on the merits. The problem, then, is one of
information conveyance and its cost. Strategic behavior and selfinterest undermine an actual, honest dialogue, which is needed for an
efficient result. Any settlement dialogue has much noise, which
becomes even more extreme when a plaintiff has a pecuniary interest
in maintaining a frivolous suit and making a credible threat. This
presents a policy question: How can the law elicit honest assessments
from the parties regarding case merit? Such an assessment would
allow the parties to settle their dispute at a cost that would reflect an
honest hypothetical dialogue between them, were the effect of selfinterest somehow nullified.
Thus far, the assumption in the literature and in the rules of civil
procedure has been that the power to deter frivolity resides with
courts. Judicially imposed fee shifting certainly could deter frivolous
litigation, but it does so at the cost of actual adjudication of the issue
or claim. The result is typically satellite litigation used to determine
whether the original action was indeed frivolous.125 Indeed, some
adjudication of the issue of frivolity is necessary to establish precedent
and to give guidance on the location of the decision standard. Also,
such fee shifting may cast too broad a net, capturing cases determined
ex post to be meritless, even though frivolity was not the plaintiff’s ex
125 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991) (expressing concern over
“extensive and needless satellite litigation” in Rule 11 inquiry); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 408 (1990) (“Moreover, including appellate attorney’s fees in a Rule
11 sanction might have the undesirable effect of encouraging additional satellite
litigation.”).
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ante intent. Thus, adjudication of frivolity is a blunt instrument that
undermines the policy of cost mitigation.
Assume now that a class of litigants, deliberating behind a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance, must arrange for the elimination of frivolous claims. They would have a choice between two normative ends:
either shift costs to the adjudged frivolous party or minimize total cost
expenditure. These goals are not coterminous. Once a suit is filed, a
party cannot judge the merits of the other’s action, and so the parties
must turn to an independent third party (the court) to determine the
issue of fee shifting at a potentially high cost of resolution. Since the
parties do not know the future assignment of the cost, they would
agree that the better goal is the deterrence and termination of frivolous cases at total minimum cost. This suggests that early in litigation,
which is the critical timeframe, information acquisition and conveyance to the court should be limited. In other words, the parties would
agree—do not litigate.126 The election scheme proposed here could
help parties to achieve this goal by incentivizing earlier settlements.
The proposal here is consistent with the goal of total cost mitigation. If a case is frivolous and both parties understand it to be, they
should come to an implied agreement on this point. The defendant
would want fee shifting. But he should not be able to do this absent
an assurance that the unilateral imposition of fee shifting is made in a
good faith effort to avoid further harm. The cost of this bonding is the
imposition of a higher standard of proof, which should be the most
efficient price of bonding if the action is indeed meritless. Conversely,
the unilateral imposition of potential fee shifting requires that the
plaintiff also provide a bond of her good faith in an implied bargain
with the defendant. She can do this by proving her case under the
default standard or by defeating the defendant’s attempt to prove his
case under the heightened standard. This is impossible if her case is in
fact frivolous. Thus, if the parties are allowed to privately order the
procedural rules to better reflect the value, risk, and cost profile of a
case, the system of public adjudication can help the parties reach a
more efficient settlement.127
126 This is an outcome that resonates with most scholars, judges, and policymakers. See
Gross & Syverud, supra note 39, at 3 (noting American judicial system’s premise that
“[t]rial is a disease, not generally fatal, but serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable
cost”).
127 The scheme advanced here is not effective if the penalty has no deterrent effect. A
judgment-proof frivolous plaintiff is problematic in the abstract. In reality, however, it is
an open empirical question as to how much frivolous litigation actually is brought by such
plaintiffs. The judgment-proof plaintiff conjures up the image of assetless, opportunistic,
and perhaps desperate people whose subsistence is to feed off the litigation system and
innocent (typically corporate) victims. For this author, this stereotype, perhaps engen-
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B. Low Value Cases and Class Actions
The low value case is essentially an inverse variant of a frivolous
suit with respect to probability. A dynamic similar to that described
above works for low value cases. These cases also present other considerations. If a plaintiff with a low value claim does not want to risk
significant cost, she must find a means by which to spread the risks
and costs. The class action was designed for this type of situation,128
but it is not a readily available option. An attorney must be willing to
undertake such a large endeavor, and an action must meet substantial
and onerous legal requirements.129 One-off low value disputes cannot
qualify for class action treatment. If there is not an existing action,
there are search and startup costs of finding an attorney and commencing an action. Most aggrieved people will not undertake this
endeavor. Thus, the potential plaintiff of a low value dispute is generally subject to the unlikely prospect that a class action exists and that
she has been identified as a class member.
If a class action exists, there are still other considerations. Many
class actions, like many individual actions, succumb to the pricing
pressures of settlement.130 In individual cases, the plaintiff can be
actively involved in the settlement discussion, providing direct input
into the issues of compensation and justice, though we recognize that
the attorney has a substantial, if not prominent, voice. But the class
action is administered by the class counsel, the defendant, and the
court, generally to the exclusion of absent class members. It is often
reduced to a basic calculation of compensation and fees. On fees,
commentators have noted that plaintiffs’ attorneys generally get too
much.131 In any attorney-client relationship, there is the problem of
dered by ideology and politics, seems cartoonish and does not rise to the quality of a general observation of the litigation system. Ordinary people do not like litigation; they have
some assets and garnishable wages; and they are risk averse. These are the realistic aspects
of our world, and reality disposes of the vast majority of the small minority of cases in
which the cartoon in fact does come to life.
128 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).
129 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (outlining numerous legal hurdles to clear in order to certify
class actions).
130 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.) (analyzing pricing pressures in class actions); Rhee, supra note 41, at 150–54
(same). See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006) (discussing class settlement pressure).
131 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 121, at 459 (noting problem of lawyer overcompensation). More generally, contingent fees have been criticized. See generally Bruce L. Hay,
The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429 (1997)
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agency cost.132 Since the relational distance between class counsel and
clients is even wider in the class action context, the problem of agency
cost must be significantly greater.
Procedural optionality would provide an alternative to the traditional class action. Importantly, the plaintiff’s prospect of compensation would no longer be substantially linked to the fortuity of whether
a class action exists. The search and start-up costs associated with initiating a class action would be eliminated for plaintiffs who were
willing to go it alone and elect to shift fees to the defendant. The
plaintiff no longer would have the legal challenge of satisfying
onerous class certification requirements.133 She would control the resolution of her dispute (settlement or litigation) and decide the price of
resolution, which may reflect pecuniary and nonpecuniary considerations. Lastly, agency cost would be reduced because there would be a
direct attorney-client relationship.
That procedural optionality would provide an alternative to the
class action may also influence the economics of class actions themselves. In a class notice, plaintiffs are advised that they can opt out of
the class and pursue their own action. For most plaintiffs, this option
is economically infeasible,134 hence the existence of the class action to
take advantage of economies of scale in the legal representation of
numerous small claims. But suppose that an economically feasible
alternative exists. Some plaintiffs may choose an individual action.
Moreover, attorneys would take these individual claims if they had a
reasonable chance of fee recovery. Thus, the election scheme creates
a new business opportunity for this group of attorneys. If the merit of
a case is strong enough, procedural optionality increases the supply of
cases, increases the demand for non-class attorneys, and decreases the
demand for class actions. As discussed, we want more litigation in the
litigation category of low value cases. Competition in the prosecution
(analyzing principal-agent problem in class action settlements); Task Force on Contingent
Fees, Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association, Report
on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation, 25 REV. LITIG. 459 (2006).
132 See also JENSEN, supra note 11, at 85–87 (discussing economic theory of agency cost);
cf. Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–05 (1996)
(applying agent-principal model to analyze proper fee levels).
133 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (denying class certification based on failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B) under theory of limited funds); Amchem,
521 U.S. at 628 (holding that requirement of commonality of issues of fact and law and
adequacy of representation were not met in settlement-only class certification).
134 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529,
1532 (2004) (presenting empirical findings showing that “on average, less than 1 percent of
class members opt-out”).
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of an action is good and would tend to reduce attorney fees and
agency cost.
The suggestion here is not that a scheme of optional fee and
proof rules would provide an alternative procedural outlet similar in
scale to the class action. The benefits of procedural optionality proposed here work mainly at the margin of this class of cases. They are
significant only if the case profile is suitable for election (that is,
clearly meritorious), which limits many actions. But when a case satisfies the conditions of election, an individually pursued action may
reduce the agency costs present in class actions, and thereby better
serve the interests of the plaintiff and society.
C. Tort Law as a Case Study
Because private ordering of procedural rules can result in more
efficient dispute resolution, procedural optionality can advance the
policies and goals underlying substantive laws, as well as increase
social efficiency. Tort law provides a good vehicle by which to test this
proposition.
To begin, most meritorious tort cases will not be suitable for procedural election. Consider the domain of accident law. It is seldom
the case that negligence is clear. Negligence is defined as the failure
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.135 Reasonableness is a highly malleable standard: “[T]he standard is known and
thus not arbitrary, but its application is uncertain and thus unpredictable to a degree.”136 The inability to precisely locate the decision
standard that will be applied by the factfinder creates significant
uncertainty.137 When liability is a close question, election would be
unwise, and only the foolish client or incompetent attorney would
pursue it. Accordingly, the influence of an election scheme would
operate at the margin of tort law—cases where the actions unambiguously should be dismissed or where liability is clear.
Procedural election would limit frivolous tort suits for the reasons
discussed above138 and would also better serve the broad policy goals
of tort law in cases with a high probability of liability.139 Although the
135 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS
§ 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (providing definition of negligence).
136 Rhee, supra note 41, at 172.
137 See id. at 171–72 (noting that negligence standards, for example, are “difficult to fix
or predict,” leading to uncertainty).
138 See supra Part III.A.
139 It should be noted that in special circumstances, when courts hold a certain behavior
negligent as a matter of law, even negligence is said to be clear and without controversy.
See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (“We think the unexcused omission of the statutory signals is more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in

560

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:514

goals of corrective justice, compensation, and deterrence compete to
be the theoretical center of gravity of tort law,140 they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, these goals are mutually reinforcing on a basic
level.141 Compensation tends to correct a wrong, and absent a legislative overhaul of tort law through some form of regulatory sanction or
universal compensation scheme,142 compensation is also the primary
means by which to deter inefficient activities. Where a case of negligence is clear, an election scheme could better serve the purposes of
compensation and deterrence in a manner that is consistent with the
principles of tort law.
The application of the American rule ensures that tort victims
receive only partial compensation.143 Since settlement is the primary
means of resolving a tort dispute in practice,144 compensation and
deterrence are largely a function of some degree of private ordering in
the shadow of the American rule, which the parties cannot change.145
In the typical tort case, there is asymmetric risk: A corporate defendant is less risk averse than an injured plaintiff, it can diversify away
the risk of a common case by holding a portfolio of similar lawsuits,
and it has greater financial resources such that the opportunity cost of
the stake at issue is lower than the plaintiff’s.146 This asymmetry of
risk produces different valuations between plaintiffs and defendants,
itself.”); Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Wis. 1963)
(holding that falling asleep while driving is negligence per se).
140 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513
(2003) (discussing various theories of tort law).
141 Cf. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1834 (1997) (“As tort objectives, then, corrective
justice and deterrence can be recognized as collaborators rather than competitors.”).
142 See generally Rhee, supra note 41, at 170–81 (arguing that negligence persists
because it promotes private resolutions of tort disputes); G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980–2000, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1341, 1344 (2001)
(observing that negligence has not been replaced with more public scheme of enterprise
liability).
143 See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 111, 114 (1991) (“A tort victim’s cost of litigating consumes roughly thirty
percent of the average damage award.”); see also Rhee, supra note 41, at 164 (“Deductions
from compensation are a structural feature of the tort system. The most obvious factor is
the American rule of attorney fees. But a less obvious structural feature . . . is the riskadjusted discount in settlement value.” (footnote omitted)).
144 It has been argued that the decision to settle versus litigate in the tort context does
not affect the goal of efficient deterrence. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 48 (arguing that
even though most cases settle, this does not affect efficiency of tort law because parties
have incentive to collect information and reach “a reasonable settlement”). But see Rhee,
supra note 41, at 168 (“Tort law is not efficient, as efficiency has been defined by the
economic model, because courts are largely irrelevant in the instrumental function of
determining value.”).
145 Rhee, supra note 41, at 127.
146 Id. at 158–60.
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even if they may view the facts and laws similarly.147 This means that
settlement valuations are typically discounted from the risk-neutral
valuations.148 Under this view, the plaintiff faces a deficiency in compensation on two fronts: self-financed attorney fees and valuation discount to the defendant.
This compensation scheme is firmly established in American tort
law, and it would be a radical departure to suggest that fee shifting
should be the general rule in tort law. Rather, an election scheme
would create a sensible exception that works at the margin of tort law.
Although many cases of negligence are ambiguous, there are some
acts where negligence is clear, even when the act is not reckless. For
example, many courts have concluded that amputating the wrong limb
is so obviously erroneous that an expert witness is not needed.149
These acts may not result from reckless conduct, but they are clearly
negligent. Many instances of negligence per se also constitute clear
breaches of the standard of care.150 There is no factual question that
the plaintiff is a victim of wrongful conduct and has been physically
and financially harmed as a result. In these cases, fee shifting is more
consistent with the principle of compensation. Moreover, to the
extent that the wrong is clear, such as with reckless conduct, greater
compensation can be both a deterrent and a punitive measure.
This short discussion of the interplay between procedural optionality and tort law shows that procedural laws can be a vital factor in
supporting and achieving the underlying policies of substantive entitlements. This idea is not new—procedural mechanisms can address
policy objectives of substantive law. For example, shareholder derivative suits are subject to a particular pleading requirement that is
designed to weed out meritless claims at the pleading stage.151 The
novel idea proposed here is that the optionality of procedural rules
can result in greater convergence of private and social interests.
Accordingly, procedural flexibility and private ordering of public
adjudication can potentially expand the means of achieving policy
147

Id. at 160.
Id. at 167.
149 Britt v. Taylor, 852 So. 2d 1128, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“Expert testimony is not
required to meet the burden of proof in a medical malpractice case involving an obvious
careless act from which a lay person can infer negligence, such as . . . amputation of the
wrong limb . . . .”); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 770 P.2d 182, 189 (Wash. 1989) (“Nonexpert testimony is sometimes admissible . . . [w]here the determination of negligence does
not require technical medical expertise, such as the negligence of amputating the wrong
limb . . . .”).
150 See supra note 139.
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring particularized pleading in shareholder derivative actions).
148
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objectives in such fields as torts, securities, corporations, and civil
rights, among others.

THE VALUE

OF

IV
PRIVATE ORDERING
ADJUDICATION

IN

PUBLIC

The preceding Parts of this Article proposed and explained a specific policy change to the litigation system and showed why that
change would increase the number of meritorious suits brought, while
simultaneously reducing the number of frivolous suits. While this
policy suggestion is interesting in itself, it represents just one example
of the value-creating potential of private ordering in public adjudication. This Part presents a broader theory of private ordering in public
adjudication.
A. Private Resolution and Public Adjudication
We tend to think of legal disputes as typically resolved in one of
two discrete, even if simultaneous, antipodal processes: private resolution or public adjudication. In economic terms, these processes constitute different pricing mechanisms.152 In private resolution,
settlement occurs only if there is a clearing price. The price of the
legal right is determined bilaterally, and thus settlement obviously
requires the other party’s cooperation and assent. If there is not a
clearing price, the price-setting forum is public adjudication, and each
party has the unilateral option to choose trial. There, the price of the
legal right is judicially determined. The litigation system acts as a
market in which information concerning dispute rights—which can be
seen as economic assets and liabilities—is developed, traded, and
assessed. Market participants resolve ambiguous claims through an
informed “bet” on the litigated value of the disputed right.153 The
structure of the litigation system, however, limits such bets to a decision on settlement or trial, that is, a choice of a bilateral or judicial
price-setting forum. Unfortunately, there is not a more sophisticated
means of allowing parties to make informed, substantial bets on the
152 See generally Rhee, supra note 38 (anayzing “the complexities of the selection
between settlement and litigation within the framework of economic efficiency”).
153 See Rhee, supra note 33, at 226 (“In the absence of market pricing, each lawsuit is a
market onto itself, and each party is forced to be a ‘market-maker’ for the other. . . . [T]he
pricing of transactions within this micro-market determines settlement and litigation
values.”); see also Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review)
(arguing that litigation markets could be erected to price suits more efficiently).
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quality of their case, independent of the other party’s choice of settlement or trial.
Private resolution and public adjudication often occupy the same
time and space, as is the case when settlement dialogue occurs during
litigation, but they are parallel universes.154 Although the parties may
pursue parallel tracks, in the end they must select one. Either the
parties or a court must ultimately determine the value of the legal
rights in a dispute.
The distinct pricing mechanisms of private ordering and public
adjudication also feature very different approaches to the process by
which the price is determined. In private resolution, parties have free
reign to rearrange their rights and obligations to their preference.
Disputants can disregard violations of the law155 or forgive them,156
can weigh inadmissible evidence when considering the merits, or can
compensate for attorney fees when the law does not so provide, just to
give a few examples. Indeed, given the prominence of private resolution as the chosen pricing mechanism for dispute resolution, one can
fairly suggest that the law “exists in the shadow of bargaining” in the
sense that the policy objectives of public substantive laws are largely
achieved in a private dispute resolution system.157
154 In the academic and policy debates, the two processes are often portrayed in stark
black and white—in terms of good and bad—reflecting the polar nature of these processes.
Scholars, judges, and policymakers overwhelmingly prefer private resolution. See, e.g., In
re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (observing “the
familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial”), aff’d, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); Gross & Syverud, supra note 39, at 3 (“Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable cost.” (footnote omitted));
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 107–08 (1994) (noting that most commentators believe “trials represent mistakes—breakdowns in the bargaining process—that
leave the litigants and society worse off than they would have been had settlement been
reached”). Indeed, courts actively discourage disputants from opting for public adjudication. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (“In short, settlements rather than
litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants.”); G. Heileman Brewing
Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 664 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Settling litigation is valuable,
and courts should promote it.”). Learned Hand’s famous attitude toward litigation reflects
the sentiment of many judges: “[A]s a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost
anything short of sickness and death.” Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach
the Heart of the Matter, Address Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Nov. 17, 1921), in JAMES N. ROSENBERG ET AL., LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS,
1921–1922, at 89, 105 (1926).
155 See supra note 41 (noting that many meritorious claims go unprosecuted).
156 The law recognizes forgiveness as a form of private ordering. See, e.g., CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1160 (West Supp. 2008) (providing evidentiary shields for benevolence and expressions of sympathy); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West 2000) (same); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 2008) (same).
157 Rhee, supra note 41, at 127; see also id. at 168–69 (arguing that settlement reduces
standard of care, as predicted by basic law and economics model of tort law).
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In public adjudication, on the other hand, parties are granted far
fewer opportunities to rearrange their rights and obligations. The
court ensures strict adherence to the law, and the law is not subject to
optional application or modification. Many rules are inflexibly mandated. If rules are subject to discretionary application, the court has
the exclusive power to exercise it. For example, even when fee
shifting is allowed, fee indemnity is not always an entitlement of the
prevailing party; it is subject to judicial discretion.158
There is almost no private choice of procedural laws in public
adjudication and, conversely, no public mandating of procedural laws
in private dispute resolution.159 But why must private choice and
public adjudication be viewed as essentially mutually exclusive?
Neither litigation nor settlement is a global panacea for the many
problems of resolving private disputes. There has been voluminous
commentary on the negative effects of litigation in our society, and so
no further comment is needed here.160 The generic, if not reflexive,
indictment against litigation is unhelpful, as it too often rings of
polemic. Certainly there are pockets of inefficiency and improvements to be made. For example, most would agree that low value
cases are underlitigated and that frivolous cases are overlitigated.
Absent the consideration of cost, litigation in both contexts would
advance societal interests, but the existence of cost produces a divergence of private and social interests.
As for settlement, a commonly asserted shibboleth is that it is
superior to public adjudication because it minimizes transaction
costs.161 This is true, at least when cost is seen narrowly as cash outlays, instead of more broadly as incorporating risk-based valuational
adjustments.162 But positive settlement can also aggravate the
problem of frivolous suits since ideally their settlement value would
be zero; if settlement were not an option and all cases were required
to proceed to trial, a frivolous suit would not be profitable. Moreover,
private resolution of the dispute induced by the American rule may
158 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1370(e)(1) (2006) (giving courts discretion to award fees to
prevailing party); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (2003) (same).
159 See supra Part I.A (discussing widespread imposition of inalienable procedural rules
in public adjudication).
160 Cf. Rhee, supra note 38, at 621 n.2 (citing sources regarding preferability of settlement to litigation in court).
161 See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV.
321, 327 (1988) (“Settlement is more efficient for the parties, giving them more of what
they hoped to gain at less cost.”); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 122 (1983) (“[B]argaining and settlement are the prevalent and, for
plaintiffs, perhaps the most cost-effective activity that occurs when cases are filed.”).
162 See supra note 33.
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reduce the value of many low value cases effectively to zero, if transaction costs exceed the expected value. The degree of positive value
depends on the defendant’s aversion to risk and the plaintiff’s credible
threat to pursue public adjudication given the transaction costs (ironically, the same calculation as that of the plaintiff in a frivolous suit).
Clearly, without transaction costs, public adjudication would
remedy the problem of frivolous suits and unprosecuted low value
cases. While settlement is always bilateral, thus giving rise to the
inference of mutual utility maximization, it does not maximize
enforcement and compliance at the lowest cost in many cases. Settlement, so often seen as an optimal solution to the transaction cost
problem of litigation, is a blunt instrument, and it ignores important
problems through a single-minded global concern for monetary cost
savings.163
B. The Need for Private Ordering in Public Adjudication
This Article rejects the view that private ordering and public
adjudication are mutually exclusive, for there is no compelling theoretical basis to support this wall. By rejecting the old axiom, we can
construct alternative processes for dispute resolution with greater
flexibility. Once public adjudication is selected, many decisions
affecting the allocation of value, cost, and risk should be placed in the
hands of the parties, who have the best information about a claim.
Greater efficiencies in the realm of public adjudication result when
the function of the court is reduced to the price-setting body of last
resort. It does not follow from the fact that a court—rather than the
parties—sets the price of the legal right in public adjudication that the
court must also inflexibly set the processes by which that price is
determined.
Outside of the price-setting function itself, the law should promote private ordering even within public adjudication. It is true that
in this regard, courts routinely (perhaps aggressively) push settlement164 and that legislatures have enacted rules to promote it.165 But
163 Accordingly, some scholars, swimming upstream perhaps, have criticized the view
that settlement is normatively superior to litigation. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement,
93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is
preferable to judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate
basis.”); Rhee, supra note 38, at 625 (“The axiomatic belief that settlement is inherently
superior is regrettable, for it is far from clear that as a general rule, settlement—more
precisely, settlement independent of litigation—provides the least costly economic transaction in contested actions.”).
164 See cases cited supra note 154.
165 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (establishing offer of judgment procedure and presenting
potential negative consequences of rejecting settlement offers).
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it is a mistake to equate the private ordering of disputes with settlement. The former is a process; the latter is an outcome. Private
ordering of a dispute is achieved when the parties are allowed to rearrange the procedural rules governing public adjudication of the dispute so as to reach an efficient result at the lowest individual and
social cost. Because procedural rules can impose significant costs and
risks on the parties, some rules should be subject to reordering by the
parties.
The idea of optional procedural rules is informed by Coase’s
work. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase showed that if transaction costs were zero, parties would rearrange their rights in a way that
maximizes efficiency irrespective of the initial assignment of the
rights.166 That is, in the context of economic production, the law is
irrelevant prior to the existence of transaction costs.167 Once transaction costs are considered, however, the rearrangement of rights only
occurs if the increase in production exceeds the cost of bringing about
this reordering.168 Coase explained:
In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have
an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.
One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is the arrangement of rights
established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same result
by altering and combining rights through the market may be so
great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value
of production which it would bring, may never be achieved.169

The broad lesson here is that the law should initially assign rights
in a way that reflects the hypothetical bargain of the parties but
should leave the parties the option of rearranging those rights through
private ordering.170 Coase argued that government interference with
private ordering can be costly:
166

Coase, supra note 8, at 2–7, 15.
In his parable of the farmer and cattle raiser, Coase showed that, in the absence of
transaction costs of bargaining and in conditions of perfect competition, parties who are
engaged in mutually harmful activity would achieve a bargain that maximizes economic
production irrespective of the initial assignment of the entitlement. Id. at 2–6. Of course,
there is a wealth effect of the initial assignment of rights to the parties involved in the
activity.
168 Id. at 15–16.
169 Id. at 16.
170 For years, courts have used the analytic heuristic of an ex ante bargain or deliberation to determine the most efficient rule of law. See, e.g., Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine,
Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 888–89 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he market itself fixes a standard
of care that reflects the preferences of potential victims as well as of potential injurers and
then the principal function of tort law, it could be argued, is to protect customers’ reasonable expectations [of] . . . the standard of care customary in the industry . . . .” (citing U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1029 (7th Cir. 1982)));
167
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It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to
get some things done at a lower cost than could a private organisation (or at any rate one without special governmental powers). But
the governmental administrative machine is not itself costless. It
can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly. . . . But equally there is
no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.171

While Coase’s analysis above regards the context of the government’s substantive rulemaking powers, specifically the law of nuisance
and property, its force applies equally to procedural entitlements and
obligations, because they, like substantive laws, greatly influence the
efficiency of the dispute outcome.
These insights show why neither the “settlement-versuslitigation” nor the “best rule” debate produces a complete solution to
the many different but interconnected problems of resolving private
disputes. In each case, the bargain of the parties may be different,
depending on the unique set of facts, laws, circumstances, and risks.172
Broad solutions inherently conflict with the nature of disparate
problems.
Procedural rules substantially determine the level of risk and the
amount of transaction costs each party must assume. Many rules are
flexible and subject to judicial discretion, and many are not.173 The
authority to invoke, reject, or reformulate many of these rules never
resides with the parties, for it has always been assumed that the sovereign generally mandates the law, often in an inflexible manner. The
issue is obvious. Given the unique circumstances of each case, can a
variable legal standard, resulting from each party’s unilateral choice
rather than a fiat of the court or legislature, minimize transaction costs
while maintaining important jurisprudential considerations of fairness
and predictability?
No single rule of procedure can be a global panacea. As shown in
the above discussion, both the American and English rules have pros
and cons, the weight of which depend on the individual circumBamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Exch.), rev’g (1860) 122 Eng. Rep. 25
(Q.B.) (analyzing nuisance case from hypothetical decision of individual owner of properties in question); see also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151, 157–58 (1973) (arguing that Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W.
221 (Minn. 1910), applied ex ante bargaining analysis to determine whether there should
be liability for damages in case of private necessity).
171 Coase, supra note 8, at 17–18.
172 Nor is arbitration the answer. It requires an ex ante contract or a legislative mandate, and it still is founded on adjudication by a third party.
173 See supra Part I.A (discussing widespread imposition of inalienable procedural rules
in public adjudication).
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stances.174 Many rules are currently legal constants and not subject to
modification at all, such as the standard of proof. The search for the
best rule or approach toward broad problems is inconclusive because
broad rules have an inherently indiscriminate quality that is sometimes inimical to contextual problem solving.
Some scholars have taken an alternative tack and considered the
permutations of different procedural aspects of dispute resolution.
The effort of Lucian Bebchuk and Howard Chang is notable.175 They
sought to combine attorney fee rules with the margin of victory, and a
formal model shows how this proposal would work under various conditions of information uncertainty, information asymmetry, and the
proposal’s implications on Rule 11. The court determines the margin
of victory, and the size of this margin may be subject to policy considerations, such as the deterrence of frivolous suits, incentivization of
public interest litigation, and so on. Thus, Bebchuk and Chang connect attorney fees to the quality of a party’s win or loss, which is the
essential Rule 11 calculus.176
While the theory of connecting fee indemnity to case merit is
sound, their proposal is problematic. From an instrumental view,
defining the precise point of sufficient margin is difficult, and absent a
clear definitional standard, we would expect significant variance
among rulings from courts. At issue is unpredictability, which always
raises costs on the parties and the litigation system. The courts not
only must undertake a laborious common law process of rulemaking
on individual cases but they must also determine whether classes of
lawsuits and causes of action should be subject to a margin of victory
scaling.177 The process of case-by-case, class-by-class review may
result in instability of the law, significant variations among fora and
jurisdictions, and greater uncertainty of outcome.
Judicial control of the fee rule is problematic for two reasons.
First, since the rule presumably applies uniformly to the entire spectrum of litigated cases, parties may be incentivized to litigate more
fiercely on the hope that they can prevail by a wide margin. Most
cases probably cannot meet the standard regardless of the parties’
increased efforts, but because there may be great uncertainty, the par174

See supra notes 15–23 (discussing various fee rules).
Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 57, at 371–72.
176 Id. at 374.
177 There are instances in which courts disfavor or view with suspicion certain kinds of
cases for various policy reasons. In these matters, the favored procedural device is the
particularized pleading. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (providing for particularized
pleading in shareholder derivative suits); DEL. CH. R. 23.1 (same). See generally
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 574–77 (2002)
(observing that heightened pleading developed in part to deter frivolous claims).
175
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ties’ efforts may spiral upward, since they may be incentivized either
to seek a wider margin of victory or to avoid one. This effect undermines the goal of minimizing the cost of litigation. Private choice of
the rules regarding fee shifting and standards of proof may promote
self-regulation of litigation efforts better than broadly applicable
rules, particularly where there is significant uncertainty.
Second, during litigation and up to judgment, the parties are
uncertain as to which fee rule will govern, since the selection of the
rule is contingent on the “margin of victory” at the litigation’s outcome. This uncertainty may be sufficient to discourage a plaintiff with
a low value case and a defendant facing a frivolous action. Without
greater clarity on the fee rules earlier in the litigation, these parties
might not gamble significant and certain cost expenditures for the
slight possibility of prevailing with fee recovery. Instead, the low cost
options of not prosecuting the dispute or choosing low value settlement, respectively, may be better and safer investment choices.178
The theory of procedural optionality allows solutions to the
choice-of-fee-rule problem like the proposal presented in the preceding Parts. As the previous sections explained, we have compartmentalized our thinking into discrete policy debates on the best
dispute-resolution process and the best rule of law.179 The Bebchuk
and Chang analysis is a laudable effort to break this habit of thought,
but it falls into the same pattern of working from the axiomatic premise that private ordering can be useful only in the context of private
dispute resolution. The drawbacks of their approach are the inevitable consequence of the axiom that public adjudication requires an
inflexible, judge-centric imposition of legal rules that allocates value,
cost, and risk upon the parties who cannot then rearrange these
important matters within the context of public adjudication.

178 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 57 (“If the
amount at stake were $10,000 or $25,000, most middle-income individuals still would be
reluctant to put $5,000 to $10,000 on the line to pursue even a strong case.”).
179 See John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 494 (1986) (“What is needed is a conscious
effort to coordinate the procedural and tort law, so that the trial can be handled as simply
as possible without the interference of frivolous litigation abuses and without inconsistent
results in the original and second trials.”). Additionally, legal analysis tends to compartmentalize rules of law according to their traditional taxonomy. See Robert J. Rhee, A
Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
805, 865 (2004) (“Judicial and scholarly analyses have tended to compartmentalize rules of
liability and damage, and have created an intellectual inertia, hindering critical analysis.”).
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CONCLUSION
The idea that litigants can unilaterally elect the procedural rules
to be applied in their cases is intellectually jarring only if one sees a
substantial conceptual barrier between private resolution and public
adjudication. The legitimacy of this barrier is universally accepted,
which is unfortunate since a greater combination of private ordering
and public adjudication could have highly beneficial effects. This
acceptance also creates contradictions between positive observations
and normative ideals. It is obvious that if parties could resolve their
disputes privately, they would not resort to costly adjudicatory
processes. It is easy to conclude that public adjudication is a result of
error or bad judgment. But it is just as easy to conclude that in a
world of ambiguous facts and laws, reciprocity of harm, and subjective
projections of inherently imperfect human decisionmaking, some disputes cannot be resolved without neutral third-party intervention.
Once adjudication is selected, the parties have committed to undertaking greater risks and costs. The risks and costs of litigation are well
known, and they are fixed in the sense that the rules of law imposing
them generally cannot be varied through the parties’ unilateral
election.
This Article advances the theory that attributes of both private
ordering and public adjudication can be blended to provide more efficient dispute resolutions. This proposition flows from Coase’s analysis
of social cost. The problem with the application of inalienable rules of
law is that each rule works well in some circumstances but not in
others. Sometimes these rules are inflexible due to the legitimate
policy considerations of fairness and predictability, and sometimes discretionary application requires substantial litigation. But fixed rules
of law can impart costs on the litigation system as well. Even in the
context of public adjudication, private parties are in the best position
to rearrange ambiguous rights so long as strategic behavior is minimized through the bonding of good faith.
The benefits of procedural optionality can be seen in this
Article’s election scheme regarding the attorney fee rules and standards of proof. This proposal specifically addresses the social
problems of frivolous litigation and low value cases. The public
interest is advanced when frivolous suits are dismissed and low value
cases are prosecuted. Yet the cost structure of litigation promotes
behavior in direct opposition to this social interest. This can result in
suboptimal enforcement of meritorious claims and in costly expenditures to avoid defending frivolous claims. This Article shows that private ordering of the rules of law can remedy this problem. The parties
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themselves, through their unilateral choice of fee shifting and concomitant bonding of their good faith belief in the clear merit of their claim
by assuming a higher standard of proof, can provide appropriate
incentives and disincentives in a way that yields greater social efficiency than under our current regime consisting mostly of inflexibly
applied rules.

